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RAPE IS TOUGH ENOUGH WITHOUT
HAVING SOMEONE KICK YOU FROM THE
INSIDE: THE CASE FOR INCLUDING
PREGNANCY AS SUBSTANTIAL BODILY
INJURY
I. INTRODUCTION
In reading the following scenarios, consider the realities, both
physical and emotional, faced by these women. First, imagine a thirteenyear-old girl who is often left at home with her stepfather and younger
siblings in the evening.1 One night, her stepfather wakes her up, takes
her into his bedroom, and rapes her.2 This continues for several months
until the thirteen-year-old girl tells her stepfather she may be pregnant.3
Her stepfather then takes her to get an abortion, which is performed
without complications.4
Next, consider an adult woman raped by a family member.5 A
Planned Parenthood counselor helps her reach the decision to have an
abortion.6 Over the next five years, the adult woman attempts suicide
five times and begins to abuse drugs to deal with the mental anguish
from her experience.7 Consider an eighteen-year-old woman who was

1
People v. Cross, 190 P.3d 706, 708–09 (Cal. 2008). In the evening, K.’s mother left her
at home alone with her stepfather and siblings. Id.
2
Id. at 709. Her stepfather would wait until her siblings were asleep and then would
take her to his bedroom. Id. The defendant raped the victim regularly. Id.
3
Id. Although K. occasionally objected to these acts, she feared that her stepfather
would take her cell phone away and not let her see her friends if she persisted. Id.
4
Id. K. underwent a surgical abortion twenty-two weeks into her pregnancy. Id. The
doctor gave K. anesthesia and dilated her cervix. Id. The abortion lasted 13.1 minutes. Id.
K. did not have any medical complications from the abortion. Id. The DNA analysis
revealed a 99.9% probability that her stepfather fathered the fetus. Id. The state prosecuted
K.’s stepfather for statutory rape. Id. The jury returned a verdict sentencing the girl’s
stepfather, Gary W. Cross, to twenty-one years to life imprisonment. Steven Ertelt,
California Planned Parenthood Made Abortion Referral, Didn’t Report Abuse, LIFENEWS.COM,
Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.lifenews.com/state3469.html. The Court found that the girl
suffered great bodily injury from the pregnancy. Cross, 190 P.3d at 712.
5
Anne Morse, Telling the Rape Victim’s Story, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, May 17, 2007,
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YTY1MTdkYmM1NDAyNjEyNGRlYTQ3ODgwOW
FiNTRkOGI=. Janet Warriner was an accounting clerk for a Fortune 500 company. Id. In
1981, a family member raped and impregnated her. Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. The rape and abortion devastated Warriner. Id. She felt that she punished an
innocent child for the acts of the child’s father. Id. This is a common feeling among
impregnated raped women who select to have an abortion. Id.
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raped by a stranger and carries the child to term.8 The woman delivers
the child and decides to give the child up for adoption.9
Each of these women faced a substantial hardship although their
pregnancies ended differently.10
Whether pregnancy results in
childbirth, miscarriage, or abortion, the pregnancy negatively affects a
woman’s physical and emotional state.11 Courts disagree, however, on
whether the physical alterations caused by pregnancy should serve as an
aggravating factor to rape, thereby extending the rapist’s sentence.12 The
physical and mental effects of pregnancy are arguably consistent with
the injuries courts currently consider substantial bodily injury.13 Thus,
pregnancy should serve as an aggravating factor under this doctrine.14
But, courts inconsistently apply the legal principle of substantial bodily
injury to pregnancy.15 Nevertheless, states should consider adopting
pregnancy as an aggravating factor by statute.16 In turn, this will deter
crime and promote justice.17 However, given the troubling history of
rape laws, it does not appear that states will quickly reform their laws.18
This Note analyzes the history of rape laws with a focus on the
aggravating factor of substantial bodily injury.19 Part II provides
background information about the injuries caused by pregnancy,
miscarriage, and abortion, and discusses how states treat evidence of
such injuries.20
Part III analyzes whether pregnancy should be
considered substantial bodily injury by determining whether the
physical effects of pregnancy, abortion, and miscarriage satisfy the

Id. Lee Ezell was raped in 1964 when she was eighteen years old. Id.
Id.
10
See infra Part II.F (discussing state treatment of pregnancy as substantial bodily
injury).
11
See infra Part II.E (discussing the mental and physical effects of pregnancy).
12
See infra Part II.F (discussing how states treat rape-related pregnancy differently).
13
See infra Part III.C (discussing how some states consider pregnancy an aggravating
factor in rape cases while others consider pregnancy an aggravating factor on a case-bycase basis or do not consider evidence of pregnancy relevant to proving rape).
14
See infra Parts III.B–C (arguing that pregnancy should be considered substantial bodily
injury in rape cases).
15
See infra Part III.C (discussing how courts treat rape-related pregnancy differently).
16
See infra Part IV (suggesting that states adopt pregnancy within their definition of
substantial bodily injury).
17
See infra Part III.D (discussing how uniform laws deter crime, promote fairness, and
reduce local prejudice).
18
See infra Part II.A (discussing the struggle women have faced prosecuting rape and the
slow evolution of rape laws).
19
See infra Part II.A–D (discussing the history of rape, current rape laws, differences
between rape and statutory rape, and the definition of substantial bodily injury).
20
See infra Part II.E–F (discussing the complications of pregnancy, miscarriage, and
abortion and how states differ in applying pregnancy as substantial bodily injury).
8
9
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definition of substantial bodily injury as defined by states.21 Part IV
proposes that states rectify this problem by including pregnancy in the
definition of substantial bodily injury.22 Because pregnancy causes a
substantial physical change beyond what the ordinary rape victim
suffers, each state’s definition of substantial bodily injury should include
pregnancy, which provides the rape victim the justice she deserves,
overcomes the history of inadequate prosecution of rape, and clarifies
the courts’ current confusion over whether pregnancy should be
considered an aggravating factor.23
II. BACKGROUND
Men have raped women throughout history, although it has not
always been looked upon disfavorably.24 Rape laws have evolved from
treating rape as a crime against the female’s owner to providing rights
and justice for women.25 With the evolution of victims’ rights comes the
question of whether pregnancy resulting from rape should be considered
an aggravating factor to the rape, regardless of the outcome of that
pregnancy.26 Part II.A first explores the evolution of rape laws.27 This
section focuses on how rape laws evolved from protecting the rapist
from false accusations to protecting the victim and treating rape
similarly to other crimes.28 Part II.B discusses the differences between

21
See infra Part III (comparing the definition of substantial bodily injury to the physical
effects of pregnancy and looking at the strengths and weakness of the approaches courts
take).
22
See infra Part IV (proposing that states either adopt a uniform definition of substantial
bodily injury, include pregnancy in their definition of substantial bodily injury, or adopt
pregnancy as an aggravating factor in their first degree rape statute).
23
See infra Part II.E–F (discussing the physical and mental effects pregnancy has on a
woman and the approaches states take in determining whether pregnancy is an
aggravating factor).
24
Office of Victims of Crimes, Summary of the History of Rape Crisis Centers,
http://www.ovcttac.gov/saact/files/summ_of_history.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2008);
Susan N. Herman, Rape (Law), MICROSOFT ENCARTA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA (2008),
http://encarta.msn.com/text_761564013___10/Rape_(law).html.
25
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 621 (2006). Earlier societies
considered the woman the property of her father or husband, so rape was treated as a
property crime against the male. Id. Today, rape laws provide rights for the victims. Id.
26
See infra Part III.B (analyzing whether the mental and physical effects of pregnancy
satisfy the definition of substantial bodily injury).
27
See infra Part II.A (discussing the history of rape laws from early societal acceptance of
rape up through the current state of rape laws).
28
See infra Part II.A (discussing how rape laws have evolved from being considered a
crime against the woman’s father or husband to a crime committed against her).
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rape and statutory rape.29 This section defines the elements of each
offense and explores what the state must prove to succeed in a suit.30
Next, Part II.C discusses the specific elements required to prove rape
across the states.31 This section focuses on the factors that allow for an
increase in the rapist’s sentence.32 Part II.D explores one of the factors
that commonly increases a rapist’s sentence: substantial bodily injury.33
This section looks at the definition of substantial bodily injury across the
states as well as examines the analysis courts traditionally use when
interpreting the definition.34 The focus of this section is injuries that
courts commonly consider substantial bodily injury.35 Because courts are
inconsistent in finding that pregnancy is substantial bodily injury, Part
II.E explores the impact that pregnancy, abortion, and miscarriage have
on a female’s body.36 Finally, Part II.F provides background on how
courts treat evidence of pregnancy for purposes of increasing the rapist’s
sentence.37
A. History of Rape Laws
Throughout history society has greatly changed its views toward
rape.38 In ancient societies, men obtained their wives by kidnapping a
woman, raping her, and then marrying her.39 As the values of societies
evolved, rape laws were established to punish the assailant and the
victim.40 Societies justified the punishment of the victim on the theory
See infra Part II.B (discussing the elements of rape and statutory rape and the
differences between them).
30
See infra Part II.B (discussing the elements of rape and statutory rape).
31
See infra Part II.C (discussing the elements states require to prove rape).
32
See infra Part II.C (discussing the aggravating factors applied by states focusing on
substantial bodily injury).
33
See infra Part II.D (discussing how states vary in interpreting substantial bodily injury
liberally, commonly, and strictly).
34
See infra Part II.D (defining substantial bodily injury across the states).
35
See infra Part II.D (defining substantial bodily injury across the states).
36
See infra Part II.E (discussing the impact pregnancy, miscarriage, and abortion have on
a female’s body).
37
See infra Part II.F (discussing court decisions that have considered whether pregnancy
is substantial bodily injury).
38
Herman, supra note 24. Rape laws greatly reflect a culture’s attitudes toward sex and
gender. Id.
39
Id. “In these societies, what we would now call rape was socially acceptable,
especially in times of war.” Id. Some societies considered this ritual, known as bride
capture, to be heroic. Id.
40
B.J. CLING, SEXUALIZED VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN 13–14 (Guilford
Press 2004). The first known rape law was written in the ancient Babylonian Code of
Hammurabi in 2250 B.C. Id. at 13. This Code considered a woman to be property of her
father or husband. Id. at 14. The Code punished a man who raped a virgin by death while
considering the virgin blameless. Id. On the other hand, a married woman who was raped
29
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that she was the property of either her father, to whom she was less
valuable after rape, or her husband, against whom she committed the
crime of adultery.41
It was not until the eleventh and twelfth centuries that the common
law crime of rape developed, and women were no longer punished for
being victims of rape.42 The statutes of Westminster greatly reformed
committed adultery against her husband and was punished by being drowned. Id.
However, the woman’s husband could save her from this fate by excusing her. Id. The
king could also excuse the rapist. Id. See also Herman, supra note 24. Punishment of rape
victims arguably is supported by the Bible. Johnny Miles, Re-reading the Power of Satire:
Isaiah’s ‘Daughters of Zion’, Pope’s ‘Belinda’, and the Rhetoric of Rape, 31.2 J. FOR THE STUDY OF
THE OLD TESTAMENT 193 (2006). This article suggests that the Bible passage concerning the
raping of the daughters of Zion promoted their punishment. Id. Hebrews also punished
rape by stoning the victim. CLING, supra, at 13–14. If the woman was within the walls of
the village and failed to call for help, she was stoned to death. Id. Shakespeare also wrote
about the “mercy killing” of a rape victim in Titus Andronicus. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
TITUS ANDRONICUS (Simon & Schuster 2005). In this play, the father killed his daughter,
who was raped, in what he believed was a mercy killing for her sins. Id. In addition,
punishment of rape victims is not confined to history and literature, as some countries
continue to punish rape victims. See CNN, Saudi: Why We Punished Rape Victim,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/11/20/saudi.rape.victim/index.html
(last
visited Sept. 25, 2008); The Independent Word, The Afghan Women Jailed for Being Victims of
Rape,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/the-afghan-women-jailed-forbeing-victims-of-rape-900658.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2008) (discussing Afghan women
who are serving jail time for being rape victims). See also DRESSLER, supra note 25, at 623.
People tend to attribute blame to the victim, regardless of whether the circumstances
suggest any responsibility on her part. Id.
41
DRESSLER, supra note 25, at 621. Fathers considered their virgin daughters valuable
since they could receive a greater dowry for their virginity. Id. Once women were
married, they were considered the property of their husband. Id. Therefore, rape was
originally a property offense against the male. Id. This concept also relates back to the
Bible, in which virginity was highly prized. Michelle Oberman, Symposium: Statutory Rape
Realities: Scholarship and Practice, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 799, 802 n.13 (2001). Deuteronomy
states that:
If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, which is not betrothed, and lay
hold on her, and lie with her, and they be found; Then the man that lay
with her shall give unto the damsel’s father fifty shekels of silver, and
she shall be his wife; because he hath humbled her, he may not put her
away all his days.
Deuteronomy 22:28–29 (King James). Roman law also viewed rape as a property crime.
CLING, supra note 40, at 14. Under Roman law, the woman was not punished for the crime
unless she consented to the abduction. Id. However, rape was punishable by death. Id. It
was not until the sixth century that Rome revised its law to make rape a crime against the
woman. Id.
42
CLING, supra note 40, at 13–14. England first permitted female victims to bring a civil
suit against the assailant during the twelfth century. Herman, supra note 24. Nevertheless,
the laws at that time required the woman to show the physical results of the rape
immediately after its occurrence. CLING, supra note 40, at 15. At that time canon law also
began to view rape as a crime of violence. Id. Four elements had to be established to prove
rape: violence, abduction, intercourse, and lack of consent. Id. at 15. The assailant could
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rape laws in 1275.43 These statutes provided that all women could be
victims of rape and allowed the Crown to prosecute rape if the victim’s
family did not.44 This statute also first criminalized statutory rape.45
However, women had a challenging time proving rape.46 In order to
establish a rape, the woman had to promptly report the rape and had to
show that she used force to stop its occurrence.47 Unless a woman could
show substantial injury, she was likely to lose.48 At trial, the court also
forced the victim to answer detailed questions about her sex life.49
By the end of the sixteenth century, the common law definition of
rape in England was the “carnal knowledge of a woman ten years or
older, forcibly and against her will.”50 The United States originally
raise the defense that the victim had slept with him before or that she consented to the act.
Id. The man could also avoid punishment by marrying the victim. Herman, supra note 24.
43
CLING, supra note 40, at 13–14. “[T]he King prohibiteth that none do ravish or take
away by force, any maiden within age, neither by her consent, nor without her consent, nor
any wife or maiden of full age, nor any other woman, against her will.” GREAT BRITAIN
COURTS, THE JURIST 327 (1866), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=
41AwAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA327&lpg=PA327&dq=the+King+prohibiteth+that+none+do+rav
ish,+nor+take+away+by+Force,+any+Maiden+within+Age&source=web&ots=BwKbKAO
Bd&sig=r4iIJ07t-ibr9jH7L5gCIW-69SI&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=5&ct=result
(last visited September 26, 2008) (quoting Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 13
(Eng.)).
44
CLING, supra note 40, at 15. Under this statute, virgins, married women, prostitutes,
and concubines could be victims of rape. Id.
45
The Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 13 (Eng.) made it a felony to have
carnal knowledge with a child under twelve years of age. Oberman, supra note 41, at 800–
01. The English law aimed to protect children from exploitation and harm. Id. at 801.
When America adopted this statutory rape law, the age of consent was established at ten
years old. Id.
46
Herman, supra note 24. “[R]ape victims were viewed with suspicion: Their
reputations were examined; they had to have third-party support to their claim; they had
to report the rape right away; they had to have cried out for help, and so on.” CLING, supra
note 40, at 15.
47
See Herman, supra note 24. This statute focused on the victim’s response to rape.
CLING, supra note 40, at 16. Furthermore, it required the woman to show that she used the
“utmost resistance” throughout the entire act of rape. Id. at 16.
48
See Herman, supra note 24; CLING, supra note 40, at 13. Early American law required a
showing of the utmost resistance. Id. at 16. Eventually courts changed this standard to
earnest resistance, followed by reasonable resistance under the circumstances. Id. Today
the standard is generally lack of consent. Id.
49
See Herman, supra note 24; CLING, supra note 40, at 15. Herman writes:
For example, the victim could be extensively cross-examined by the
accused rapist’s attorney to show that (1) she had consented to sexual
intercourse with the defendant (accused rapist) on that or another
occasion, (2) she had consented to sexual intercourse with another man
or men, or (3) she did not have a good reputation for chastity.
Herman, supra note 24.
50
CLING, supra note 40, at 16. This is the definition of rape originally adopted in the
United States. Id.
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adopted this definition of rape, but included additional protections to
prevent false accusations.51
Rape laws remained unchanged for
centuries.52 However, the Women’s Movement in the 1970s rapidly
changed the rape laws in the United States.53 Women fought for rape
laws that focused on the crime committed against the woman, as
opposed to the common law statutes that were concerned with
protecting the assailant from false accusations.54 Women successfully
argued that they should not have to receive substantial injury in order to
prosecute an assailant.55 In reaction to the Women’s Movement, most
states redefined rape and made it easier to prosecute rapists.56 States
also developed rape shield laws to protect a woman’s privacy and
encourage the reporting of rape.57 Some states even went so far as to
adopt the death penalty as punishment for rape.58
51
Herman, supra note 24. Although the common-law definition of rape provided women
with some protection, rape was difficult to prove. CLING, supra note 40, at 16. Sir Mathew
Hale, Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, stated that rape “is an accusation easy to be
made, hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused though ever so
innocent”. Id. at 16. Under early American law, the crime was considered rape only if the
woman resisted throughout the entire rape. Id. The United States added additional
safeguards such as a special corroboration rule for rape prosecutions and a prohibition
against women claiming rape by their husband. Herman, supra note 24. Under this rule, if
the woman could not show any evidence, such as semen or bruises, to corroborate her
testimony, the court deemed her evidence insufficient to convict the assailant. Id.
52
Oberman, supra note 41, at 803. For centuries, states focused on whether the woman
used the “utmost resistance” during the course of the rape. CLING, supra note 40, at 16. It
was not until the 1950s that rape laws began to change. Id. The first version of the Model
Penal Code was released in the 1950s, which focused on the assailant’s behavior, not the
victim’s response. Id. Throughout the 1970s states continued to reform their rape statutes.
Herman, supra note 24.
53
Herman, supra note 24. The Women’s Movement fought to change the focus from the
victim’s resistance to the assailant’s actions because women who resisted rapists were more
likely to suffer injury. Id. The identification of Rape Trauma Syndrome also played a role
in reforming the rape statutes. Id. Rape Trauma Syndrome consists of “specific behavioral,
somatic, and psychological reactions caused by a rape or sexual assault.” 12 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS 3D Rape Trauma Syndrome 401 § 1 (2008).
54
Herman, supra note 24. Women also criticized rape laws for being focused on
protecting men from false accusations rather than protecting women. Id. “According to
these activists, the laws not only failed to adequately protect women, they often did
women harm.” Id. Early women’s rights activists viewed rape laws as a sign of a woman’s
lack of autonomy and male dominance. MARIA BEVACQUA, RAPE ON THE PUBLIC AGENDA
18 (UPNE 2000).
55
CLING, supra note 40, at 16. The Model Penal Code, first introduced in the 1950s,
focused on the assailant’s behavior, not the victim’s. Id. Some states, such as New York
and Michigan, repealed the corroboration requirement for rape in the 1970s. Id. Michigan
also eliminated the resistance requirement. Id. at 17.
56
Id.
57
Id.; Herman, supra note 24. A rape shield statute is a “statute that restricts or prohibits
the use, in rape or sexual-assault cases, of evidence about the victim’s past sexual conduct.”
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The Women’s Movement also spurred reform of statutory rape
law.59 Prior to the Women’s Movement, states seldom prosecuted
statutory rape.60 However, following this movement, enforcement of
statutory rape laws increased drastically, driven by the rise in teenage
pregnancy and the problems in enforcing the conventional rape laws.61
In particular, many states began to prosecute rape more rigorously when
an older man impregnated a minor.62 States justified the rigorous
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1502 (9th ed. 2009). Previous to rape shield statutes, defendants
could introduce evidence that the woman was unchaste to show the possibility of consent
by the victim. Joe E. Smith, Annotation, Constitutionality of “Rape Shield” Statute Restricting
Use of Evidence of Victim's Sexual Experiences, 1 A.L.R.4th 283 (1980). However, the
admission of such evidence was criticized as being humiliating and prejudicial against the
woman. Id. There was also a lack of consensus on whether a woman who engaged in nonmarital intercourse was more likely to consent. Id.
Apparently in response to increasing attacks on the traditional rules of
evidence as to unchastity, a number of state legislatures, as well as
Congress, have enacted rape shield laws which are designed to restrict
or even prohibit the use of evidence respecting the chastity of the
victim of rape or other sexual offense.
Id.
58
Herman, supra note 24. See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the
death penalty was grossly disproportionate to the crime of rape and in violation of the
Eighth Amendment). This case shows that some states, such as Georgia, adopted the death
penalty as a form of punishment for rape. Id. However, the Supreme Court did not uphold
this method of punishment. Id. Louisiana’s death penalty statute for statutory rape was
recently struck down as unconstitutional. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2677
(2008).
59
Oberman, supra note 41, at 803. The Women’s Christian Temperance Union and
various feminist leaders led the charge to increase the age of consent. Id. Various feminist
leaders also fought to increase the prosecution of statutory rape. Id.
60
Id. States also had a difficult time prosecuting rape due to the barriers established by
the common law rape statutes that states originally adopted. Id. at 808. Social views on
statutory rape also impede the state’s ability to prosecute a defendant indicted for statutory
rape. Id. Society tends to view rape victims with skepticism and to excuse the defendant’s
behavior as normal. Id. at 816–17. For example, in Michael M. v. Sonoma County, the
underage rape victim fit within California’s statutory rape law and presented evidence that
force was used against her. 450 U.S. 464, 482 (1980). However, Justice Blackmun seemed
apologetic and defensive about enforcing the statutory rape law. Id. at 481–88 (Blackmun,
J., concurring); Oberman, supra note 41, at 808 n.33.
61
Oberman, supra note 41, at 808. “In the 1990s, a series of studies indicated that adult
men fathered a startling high number of babies born to young teen mothers.” Id.
62
Id. Approximately eight percent of minor rape victims are impregnated from the rape
and are abandoned by the father. Jim Rendon, Jail Bated, METROACTIVE, Dec. 18–24, 1997,
http://www.metroactive.com/papers/metro/12.18.97/cover/teensex-9751.html.
This
puts a burden on states that often bear the cost of supporting these victims and their
children through welfare. Oberman, supra note 41, at 811. In some states, prosecutors
acknowledge that their top priority is to prosecute assailants who impregnate young
teenage girls. Id. at 813. See also Rigel Oliveri, Statutory Rape Law and Enforcement in the
Wake of Welfare Reform, 52 STAN. L. REV. 463, 483 n.151 (2000) (discussing the increased
financial burden placed on states from rape-related teenage pregnancy).
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prosecution of rape that resulted in pregnancy to teenagers on the
grounds that impregnated teenagers had diminished life options and the
state’s need to regulate teenage pregnancy.63 States also drastically
increased the age of consent from ten years of age to sixteen in most
states.64
Today rape and statutory rape laws are intended to protect the
victims, which is clear by the evolution of laws that have made it easier
to prosecute a rapist.65 However, rape remains a widespread problem
throughout our country, every year affecting nearly 191,670 women over
the age of twelve and another fifteen percent of children under the age of
twelve.66 Today’s rape laws are more effective than in the past, but there
is still room for improvement.67
B. Differences Between Rape and Statutory Rape Laws
Today, states recognize rape and statutory rape as independent
offenses comprising different elements.68 Statutory rape is commonly

63
Oberman, supra note 41, at 810. Twenty-eight percent of teenage mothers remain poor
throughout their twenties and thirties. Medical Institute, What Happens to Teen Mothers,
http://www.medinstitute.org/public/118.cfm (last visited Sept. 26, 2008). Seven percent
will remain poor for the remainder of their lives. Id. Only seventy percent of teenage
mothers finish high school or receive their GED. Id. Teen mothers are more likely to
remain single parents and to suffer serious health and emotional problems. Id.
64
Oberman, supra note 41, at 803. This was driven by the Women’s Christian
Temperance Union to protect females from laws and values that threatened their wellbeing. Id.
65
See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text (discussing how the Women’s
Movement reformed rape laws, inducing harsher punishment).
66
Shannon M. Catalano, Criminal Victimization, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
Sept. 2006, http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv05.pdf. In 2005, 191,670 people over the
age of twelve were raped. Id. While reported rapes have decreased since 1973, an
estimated 14.8% of all women are victims of rape at some point in their lives. Rape, Abuse
& Incest National Network, Who Are the Victims?, http://www.rainn.org/getinformation/statistics/sexual-assault-victims (last visited Sept. 26, 2008). In 1992, fifty-one
percent of all rape victims were under the age of eighteen. Patrick A. Langan and Carolyn
Wolf Harlow, Child Rape Victims, 1992, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, June 1994,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/chilrape.txt.
67
See infra Part II.B (discussing rape and statutory rape laws).
68
The federal statutory rape statute states anyone commits statutory rape if he:
knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who—
(1) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age
of 16 years; and
(2) is at least four years younger than the person so engaging; or
attempts to do so . . . ..
18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2000). In the Model Penal Code rape is defined as:
A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty
of rape if:
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defined as the “carnal knowledge of a juvenile under a stated age, with
or without her consent.”69 On the other hand, states define rape as the
“unlawful sexual intercourse committed by a man with a woman not his
wife through force and against her will.”70 The important difference
between these crimes is that rape requires a showing of lack of consent,
whereas statutory rape simply requires proof of penetration.71 States
justify the differences between rape and statutory rape on the purposes
behind these laws.72
Legislatures enacted statutory rape laws to protect minors from their
inexperience, vulnerability, and unawareness of the consequences that
may result from engaging in sexual activities.73 For these reasons,
(a)

he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent
death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to
be inflicted on anyone; or
(b) he has substantially impaired her power to appraise or
control her conduct by administering or employing without
her knowledge drugs, intoxicants or other means for the
purpose of preventing resistance; or
(c) the female is unconscious; or
(d) the female is less than 10 years old.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1.
69
65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 11 (2008). See also Deen v. State, 11 S.E.2d 595 (Ga. 1960) (stating
that consent is not material in a statutory rape case); Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797 (Md.
1993) (holding that a twenty-year-old male who had an IQ of fifty-two and who engaged in
consensual intercourse with a minor was guilty of statutory rape because mistake of age
was immaterial).
70
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1288 (8th ed. 2004). Many jurisdictions altered this
definition to protect women. DRESSLER, supra note 25, at 631. States recognize that force
may not always be necessary to prove rape. Id. Instead, most courts merge the concepts of
force and non-consent, so that a woman who does not consent and is not subject to force
may prosecute an assailant. Id. at 632–33. States no longer require women to use force
against the assailant. Id. Furthermore, many states now find that a husband can rape his
wife. 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 30 (2008). Specifically, twenty-four states and the District of
Columbia altered their statutes so that husbands can now be prosecuted for the rape of
their wives. Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper
Inferences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1468–70 (2003).
71
Juveniles are legally incapable of consenting to rape, so proof of penetration and age is
all that is required for a conviction. 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 11 (2008). Statutory rape is a
strict liability offense. DRESSLER, supra note 25, at 166. Any defendant’s “erroneous belief,
no matter how reasonable, that the female with whom he is having intercourse is old
enough to consent, will not exculpate him.” Id. Rape, however, requires proof of lack of
consent. Id. at 626. See also Sherry F. Colb, The Pros and Cons of Statutory Rape Laws, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/13/findlaw.analysis.colb.statutory.rape/index.html.
72
See infra notes 73–77 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of rape and
statutory rape laws and the differences between the two types of laws).
73 Oberman, supra note 41, at 818. Sherry Colb writes for CNN:
Though a statutory rape charge would not require proof of force or
coercion, feminists observed, young girls were (and may continue to
be) especially vulnerable to being raped by the adults in their lives. In
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minors cannot legally give consent.74 Therefore, a showing of mere
penetration satisfies state and federal statutory rape laws.75
On the other hand, an adult woman can give consent because she is
of the legal age to make the decision to engage in sexual intercourse.76
Since adult women can consent, rape requires proof that the victim did
not consent to the sexual intercourse.77 Therefore, the victim must show
one study, for example, seventy-four percent of women who had
intercourse before age fourteen and sixty percent of those who had sex
before age fifteen report having had a forced sexual experience.
Sherry F. Colb, The Pros and Cons of Statutory Rape Laws, CNN, Feb. 13, 2004, http://www.
cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/13/findlaw.analysis.colb.statutory.rape/index.html.
74
65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 11. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 794.011(2)(a) (2002); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-6-1(a)(1) (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520d(1)(a) (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-365(1998); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3122.1 (West 2000); Stevens v. State, 332 S.W.2d 482,
482 (Ark. 1960) (finding that it was legally impossible for the eleven-year-old victim to give
consent); Khianthalat v. State, 935 So. 2d 583, 584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that the
sixteen-year-old victim was legally incapable of giving consent); Wightman v. State, 656
S.E.2d 563, 566 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“The fact that a victim is under the age of consent may
supply the ‘against her will’ element in a forcible rape case since it shows that the victim is
incapable of giving legal consent.”) (internal quotation omitted); People v. Starks, 701
N.W.2d 136, 141 (Mich. 2005) (holding that complainant, who was under the age of
thirteen, could not give valid consent); Phillipson v. State, 943 So. 2d 670, 672 (Miss. 2006)
(holding that a minor who fits within the state’s statutory rape statute does not have the
legal power to give consent); C.C.H. v. Philadelphia Phillies, Inc., 940 A.2d 336, 350 (Pa.
2008) (holding that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that a person under
the age of thirteen is legally incapable of giving consent); Lewis v. State, 191 S.W.3d 225,
228 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (finding that consent was not at issue in the charged offense
because a victim under the age of seventeen is legally incapable of consenting); State v.
Deyo, 915 A.2d 249, 253 (Vt. 2006) (holding that sexual intercourse is nonconsensual as a
matter of law since the victim was under the age of sixteen); Christensen v. Royal School
Dist. No. 160, 124 P.3d 283, 286 (Wash. 2005) (finding that a minor lacks the capacity to
consent). The term “minor” is defined by state law, so the age of consent varies by state.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70 (2000) (defining the age of consent as sixteen); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1405(a) (2004) (defining the age of consent as eighteen years of age); COLO.
REV. STAT § 18-3-402 (2008) (defining the age of consent as seventeen years old).
75
See 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006).
76 RICHARD G. SINGER & JOHN Q. LA FOND, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS CRIMINAL LAW
223–24 (Wolters Kluwer 2007). “If the woman consented to sexual relations, then the
defendant could not be convicted of rape.” Id. at 223. However, an adult woman with a
low IQ who is unable to understand the potential consequences of sexual intercourse is
legally incapable of giving consent. Id. at 224. See State v. Soura, 796 P.2d 109 (Idaho 1990);
65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 7.
77 SINGER & LA FOND, supra note 76, at 234. Many states are moving towards eliminating
non-consent as an element of rape. Id. This is because states are recognizing the reality
that some women submit to rape to protect themselves from physical harm. See Dr. Gail
Reekie and Paul Wilson, Rape, Resistance, and Women’s Rights of Self-Defense, AUSTRALIAN
INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY, http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/proceedings/20/reekie.
pdf. Consent, however, is still a definitional component or affirmative defense in most
states. Id. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2008); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021
(Vernon 2003).
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more than mere penetration.78 Although states agree on the definition of
rape and statutory rape, states treat rape differently.79
C. Current Rape Laws
States punish rape more harshly than any crime except homicide.80
The Model Penal Code and several states treat basic rape as a seconddegree felony.81 However, these states elevate rape to a first-degree
felony when aggravating factors are present.82 Aggravating factors
generally include the commission of another felony, use of a deadly
weapon, or infliction of serious injury on the victim.83 Some states apply
a more liberal standard, providing that evidence of substantial pain is
sufficient to increase the rapist’s sentence.84 These states consider
aggravating factors as an element of the crime.85 Other states treat rape
78
SINGER & LA FOND, supra note 76, at 220. “Generally the prosecution [must] prove:
(1) The defendant had sexual intercourse (penetration by the penis of the vulva), (2) with a
woman not his wife, (3) using physical force or the threat of force, and (4) without her
consent.” Id. at 220–21.
79
See infra, Part II.C (discussing current rape laws). Statutory rape is committed with or
without the consent of the victim. 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 11. But, rape requires the act to be
non-consensual. SINGER & LA FOND, supra note 76, at 234–35.
80
DRESSLER, supra note 25, at 619. The maximum penalty in most states for rape is life
imprisonment or a substantial number of years. Id. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b
(2004) (setting life imprisonment as the maximum penalty); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42.1
(2007) (setting the penalty for forcible rape to not less than five years, but not greater than
forty years); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1115 (2007) (“Rape in the first degree is a felony
punishable by death or imprisonment in the custody of the Department of Corrections, for
a term of not less than five (5) years, life or life without parole.”).
81
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62 (2000) (rape is a felony in the second degree if the
assailant engages in sexual intercourse with a victim who is legally incapable of giving
consent); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.420 (2006); MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (2008). For
purposes of this Note, basic rape means rape without any aggravating or mitigating
factors.
82
DRESSLER, supra note 25, at 647. See also ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62 (2000) (stating that
rape is a crime in the first degree if the assailant uses force or engages in relations with
someone who is physically helpless or incapacitated or younger than twelve); ALASKA
STAT. § 11.41.410 (2006); MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (2008).
83
SINGER & LA FOND, supra note 76, at 235. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1)(d)
(2008), which specifically states:
Rape is a felony of the second degree unless (i) in the course thereof
the actor inflicts serious bodily injury upon anyone, or (ii) the victim
was not a voluntary social companion of the actor upon the occasion of
the crime and had not previously permitted him sexual liberties, in
which cases the offense is a felony of the first degree.
84
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 2 (2008) (defining substantial bodily injury as
an injuries requiring extended convalescence to recover); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-302(a)(ii)
(2008) (stating that extreme pain is enough to aggravate the rapist’s sentence).
85
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402 (2004) (stating that sexual assault is a class four felony,
unless the crime involved any of the factors listed in subsections (3), (3.5), (4), or (5) of the
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as a felony and allow aggravating and mitigating factors to affect the
sentencing of the crime within a pre-defined range.86 In these states,
section, which may alter the class of felony the crime falls into); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a70 to -73a (2007) (listing the elements of first through fourth degree sexual assault); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 769 (2009) (stating that rape is a felony in the third degree, unless the
assailant causes substantial bodily injury or engages in relations with a child under
sixteen); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 707-730 to -733 (2008) (defining sexual assault in the first,
second, third, and fourth degrees); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-14, 14.1, 15, 16 (2008) (listing
the elements for the degrees of rape); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1 (2004) (defining the elements of
rape as a class B and class A felony); IOWA CODE §§ 709.2–.4 (2003) (defining sexual abuse
in the first, second, and third degrees); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.040, 510.050, 510.060
(West 2008) (listing the elements for first, second, and third degree rape); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 253 (2004) (defining the elements to determine if gross sexual assault is a
Class B or C felony.); MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL LAW §§ 3-303, 304 (West 2006) (defining
rape in the first and second degrees); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.520b–e (2004) (defining the
elements of first through fourth degree criminal sexual conduct); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 609.342 to -.345, 609.3451 (2004) (defining criminal sexual conduct in the first through
fifth degree); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-320 (2008) (defining sexual assault in the second degree
as one that results in bodily injury to the victim and sexual assault in the third degree as an
assault that does not result in physical injury to the victim); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.366
(2008) (defining the elements and exceptions for determining if sexual assault is a Class A
felony); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 2006) (defining the elements of aggravated sexual
assault, a first-degree felony, and sexual assault, a second-degree felony); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 130.25, 130.30, 130.35 (McKinney 2008) (setting forth the elements of rape in the third,
second, and first degrees respectively); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2 to -27.5 (2008) (listing the
elements of first and second degree rape and first and second degree sexual offense); N.D.
CENT. CODE, § 12.1-20-07(2) (2004) (defining the elements of rape as a Class C felony, Class
A misdemeanor, and Class B misdemeanor); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1114, 1116 (2008)
(defining rape in the first and second degrees); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-2, 11-37-4, 11-37-6
(2004) (stating the elements of first, second, and third degree sexual assault); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-3-652 to -654 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1 (2004) (defining the elements
of first, second, third, and fourth degree rape); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-502 to -505
(2004) (stating the elements of aggravated rape, rape, aggravated sexual battery, and sexual
battery); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.011, 22.021 (Vernon 2008) (defining the elements of
sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 3252, 3253 (2006)
(stating the elements of sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault); WASH. REv. CODE
§§ 9A.44.040, 9A.44.050, 9A.44.060 (2009) (defining rape in the first, second, and third
degrees respectively); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8B-3 to -5 (2004) (listing the elements of sexual
assault in the first, second, and third degrees); WIS. STAT. § 940.225 (2008) (defining the
elements of first, second, third, and fourth degree sexual assault); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2302 to -304 (2004) (defining first, second, and third degree sexual assault).
86
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702.01 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (2004); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 261, 264 (West 2006); Cal. R. of Ct. 4.421 (2006) (discussing aggravating
factors); D.C. CODE § 22-3020 (2008) (permitting a victim to be punished up to one and a
half times the maximum penalty for the crime committed if aggravating factors are
present); FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (2)–(4) (2006); GA. CODE ANN., § 16-6-1 (2006); IDAHO CODE
ANN. §§ 18-6101, 18-6109 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3502, 21-4625 (2004) (defining rape
and the aggravating factors); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:41 to -:43 (2004); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 905.4–905.5 (2004) (defining the elements of the offense and the events that
aggravate or mitigate the punishment within the given offense). MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265,
§ 22 (2006) (defining rape and the circumstances that can lengthen the sentence); MISS.
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aggravating factors are not an element of the crime.87 In any case,
aggravating circumstances increase the offender’s sentence.88 Although
aggravating factors have the effect of increasing an assailant’s sentence,
states apply these factors differently, specifically the substantial bodily
injury factor. Therefore, it is necessary to first analyze how states define
substantial bodily injury.89
D. Substantial Bodily Injury Defined
In most states, substantial bodily injury is an aggravating factor that
increases the length of time a rapist can be punished by increasing the
sentence or raising the degree of the felony for which the rapist is
prosecuted.90 States differ in how they define substantial or serious
bodily injury.91 Overall, “[i]t is apparent . . . that something more than
the physical injury normally associated with crimes of sexual abuse is

CODE ANN. §§ 99-19-355, 97-3-95 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.030 (West 2006) (defining
rape and the circumstances that enhance the sentence); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502 (2008)
(defining sexual assault and the factors that increase or decrease the punishment); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2 (stating that aggravated sexual assault is a felony, but not a
specific degree of felony); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 2008) (defining rape as
first degree felony that is punishable according to the aggravating and mitigating factors
that are present); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.080 (2004) (stating that the maximum penalty that
can be imposed is determined by the aggravating circumstances); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-402 (2006) (defining rape as a felony in the first degree and including elements the
court can consider when imposing a sentence); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (2008) (stating the
elements of rape and that punishment can be imposed at the discretion of the court or jury).
See also Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Sufficiency of Bodily Injury to Support Charge of
Aggravated Assault, 5 A.L.R. 5th 243 (1992).
87
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors for Sex Crimes, WESTLAW, available at 0030 SURVEYS
31.
88
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 259–60 (8th ed. 2004).
89
See infra Part II.D. (defining substantial bodily injury among the states).
90
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410 (2006) (serious physical injury elevates rape to a
first degree felony); D.C. CODE § 22-3020 (2008) (listing the aggravating factors, including
the infliction of serious bodily injury to the victim); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0016 (2006)
(elevating the punishment for crimes that cause physical injury to the victim); MICH. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-303(4) (2004) (listing substantial bodily injury as an aggravating factor); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(2)(a)(i) (Vernon 2004) (requiring serious bodily injury to
support a finding of aggravated sexual assault).
91
Compare Payne v. Unites States, 932 A.2d 1095 (D.C. 2007) (“‘Serious bodily injury,’
which is required to be shown to prove aggravated assault while armed, is bodily injury
that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain,
protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a
bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.”), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106 (2006)
(“‘Bodily injury’ includes a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn or disfigurement, and physical pain
or temporary illness or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental
faculty.”).
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required to establish this aggravating element.”92 State statutes generally
define the severity of the injury required to increase a sentence.93
92
Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Sufficiency of Allegations or Evidence of Serious Bodily
Injury to Support Charge of Aggravated Degree of Rape, Sodomy, or Other Sexual Abuse, 25
A.L.R. 4th 1213 (1983).
93
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.7(f) (West 2008) (“‘great bodily injury’ means a
significant or substantial physical injury”); COLO. REV. STAT. §18-1-901(p) (2008)
(specifically stating:
”Serious bodily injury” means bodily injury which, either at the time
of the actual injury or at a later time, involves a substantial risk of
death, a substantial risk of serious permanent disfigurement, a
substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the function of any
part or organ of the body, or breaks, fractures, or burns of the second
or third degree.)
; D.C. CODE § 22-3001 (2006) (“‘Bodily injury’ means injury involving loss or impairment of
the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or physical disfigurement,
disease, sickness, or injury involving significant pain.”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700 (2006)
(“‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or
which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ.”); IND. CODE § 35-41-1-25 (2004) (“‘Serious bodily
injury’ means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes: (1)
serious permanent disfigurement; (2) unconsciousness; (3) extreme pain; (4) permanent or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ; or (5) loss of a
fetus.”); IOWA CODE § 702.18 (2008) (specifically stating:
“Serious injury” means any of the following: a. Disabling mental
illness. b. Bodily injury which does any of the following: (1) Creates a
substantial risk of death. (2) Causes serious permanent disfigurement.
(3) Causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ. c. Any injury to a child that requires surgical repair
and necessitates the administration of general anesthesia. 2. “Serious
injury” includes but is not limited to skull fractures, rib fractures, and
metaphyseal fractures of the long bones of children under the age of
four years.)
; 17-A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 2.23 (2006) (“‘Serious bodily injury’ means a bodily
injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent
disfigurement or loss or substantial impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ, or extended convalescence necessary for recovery of physical health.”); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.02 (7a) (2004) (“‘Substantial bodily harm’ means bodily injury which involves a
temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss
or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or which causes a fracture of
any bodily member.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(66)(a) (2008) (specifically stating:
“Serious bodily injury” means bodily injury that: (i) creates a
substantial risk of death; (ii) causes serious permanent disfigurement
or protracted loss or impairment of the function or process of a bodily
member or organ; or (iii) at the time of injury, can reasonably be
expected to result in serious permanent disfigurement or protracted
loss or impairment of the function or process of a bodily member or
organ. (b) The term includes serious mental illness or impairment.)
; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-1 (West 2004) (“‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury which
creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ”); 30 PA.
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Some states apply a liberal construction of substantial bodily
injury.94 For example, Illinois considers any evidence of bodily harm
sufficient to support a conviction of aggravated sexual assault.95 Other
states do not require proof of physical injury.96 In those states, fear or
mental injuries may constitute substantial bodily injury.97
Other states strictly define substantial bodily injury for means of
increasing a defendant’s sentence.98
For example, Texas defines
STAT. ANN. § 5502.3(b) (West 2006) (“‘[S]erious bodily injury’ means any bodily injury that
creates a substantial risk of death or that causes serious permanent disfigurement or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.”); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-11-106 (2006) (“‘Bodily injury’ includes a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn or
disfigurement, and physical pain or temporary illness or impairment of the function of a
bodily member, organ, or mental faculty); TEX. CODE ANN. § 1.07(46) (Vernon 2004)
(“‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that
causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (2005)
(“‘Substantial bodily injury’ means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury,
that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss
or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1021 (2006) (“‘Serious bodily injury’” means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk
of death or which causes substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ or substantial impairment of health, or substantial disfigurement”);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.04.110(4)(b) (2006) (“‘Substantial bodily harm’ means bodily injury
which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary
but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ, or which
causes a fracture of any bodily part”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-104(x) (2004) (“‘Serious
bodily injury’ means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes
miscarriage, severe disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any
bodily member or organ”).
94
See infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text (discussing states that liberally construe
their definition of substantial bodily injury).
95
See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 495 N.E.2d 665, 667–68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). See supra Part
II.E (discussing the hardships of pregnancy); March of Dimes, Prenatal Care,
http://www.marchofdimes.com/hbhb_syndication/18622_513.asp (last visited Oct. 30,
2008) (discussing the side effects resulting from failure to seek prenatal care).
96
State v. Ingram, 688 So. 2d 657, 665 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that the victims’ fear
that the assailant would harm them ifthey refused was sufficient to support a finding of
aggravated rape); Jackson v. State, 968 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that
the victim’s fear of bodily injury was sufficient evidence to aggravate the assailant’s
sentence); State v. Baker, 441 S.E.2d 551, 555 (N.C. 1994) (finding that the rape victim’s
mental injuries, which included weight loss, depression, trouble sleeping, and a difficult
time interacting with others to be serious personal injury); Mata v. State, 952 S.W.2d 30, 33
(Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that threats of bodily injury were sufficient to aggravate the
rapist’s sentence).
97
See Ingram, 688 So. 2d at 665; Baker, 441 S.E.2d at 555; Jackson, 968 S.W.2d at 501; Mata,
952 S.W.2d at 33.
98
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0 (2)–(3) (“‘[B]odily injury’ means physical pain,
illness or any impairment of physical condition; [ . . . ] ‘serious bodily injury’ means bodily
injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
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substantial bodily injury as “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk
of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ.”99 However, even states with a strict definition of substantial
bodily injury apply the term liberally. 100 Some states that fall within this
category do not consider injuries that occur after the act of intercourse to
be substantial bodily injury.101
Furthermore, most states do not require evidence of permanent
injury to satisfy their definition of substantial bodily injury.102
Traditionally, states include broken bones, lacerations, torn hymen, and
the like as substantial bodily injury.103 States also generally consider
injuries that must be treated by surgery as substantial bodily injury.104

organ”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(46); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-1-104, 6-2-302(a)(ii)
(2004) (“‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of
death or which causes miscarriage, severe disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment
of the function of any bodily member or organ.”).
99
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(46) (Vernon 2004). See also Webb v. State, 801 S.W.2d
529, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (holding that an injury that results in surgery to repair a
broken bone did not amount to serious bodily injury); Moore v. State, 802 S.W.2d 367, 369–
70 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the victim’s injury which required reconstructive
surgery was serious bodily injury because the victim would have suffered permanent
disfigurement if he did not undergo surgery); Dougherty, supra note 92.
100
See, e.g., Camarillo v. State, 82 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the victim
suffered substantial bodily injury where she suffered a broken nose that impaired her
ability to breath); Moore, 802 S.W.2d at 369–70 (holding that injury still exists although
surgery corrected disfigurement); Abadie v. State, 101 S.W.2d 238, 239 (Tex. Crim App.
1937) (finding that evidence that the victim was weak, unable to work, and had to remain
in the hospital for fourteen days was sufficient to support a finding of substantial bodily
injury).
101
Dougherty, supra note 92. Compare State v. Blackstock, 333 S.E.2d 245, 251 (N.C. 1985)
(finding that evidence of serious personal injury inflicted after the assault was sufficient to
support a conviction of aggravated assault because the injury was inflicted for the purpose
of concealing the rapist’s criminal acts and aiding his escape), with State v. Gray, 233 S.E.2d
905, 919–20 (N.C. 1977) (finding that evidence of stabbing that occurred after rape was not
evidence of substantial bodily injury for the rape case).
102
Dougherty, supra note 92. See, e.g., State v. Mace, 665 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that victim who suffered no permanent injury to her vaginal area or disfiguring
injury of any kind suffered substantial bodily injury).
103
See People v. Williams, 115 Cal. App. 3d 446, 454 (1981) (finding that evidence of a
torn hymen and accumulation of blood was sufficient to support a finding of substantial
bodily injury); People v. Culton, 92 Cal. App. 3d 113, 117 (1979) (finding evidence of
bruises, abrasions, and broken bones to support a conviction of substantial bodily injury);
State v. Roberts, 235 S.E.2d 203, 213 (N.C. 1977) (holding that injuries constituted serious
bodily injury where the victim’s teeth would eventually fall out and there was pain and
impairment in the function of the jaw).
104
Dougherty, supra note 92. E.g., State v. Lilly, 450 S.E.2d 546, 548-49 (N.C. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that victim sustained serious personal injuries where she had to have
surgery that required three days’ recovery time).
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When minors are rape victims, all states tend to broaden the definition of
substantial bodily injury.105 Whereas adult rape victims usually have to
prove injury beyond that which normally results from rape, minors who
suffer pain and bleeding have been successful at arguing that they
suffered substantial bodily injury.106 In addition, states willingly
recognize pregnancy as substantial bodily injury in cases involving
minors.107
E. Complications of Pregnancy, Abortion, and Miscarriage
Pregnancy shares many characteristics with injuries that are
traditionally considered substantial bodily injury.108 All pregnancies end
in one of three ways: childbirth, abortion, or miscarriage.109 Every
pregnancy, however, has significant physical and psychological
effects.110
1.

Childbirth

“Childbirth is an agonizing experience.”111 When labor begins, the
woman feels pain in her abdomen.112 Powerful uterine contractions and
See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 642 N.E.2d 1317, 1321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (finding
aggravated assault where there was medical evidence of a perforated hymen and two
bruises on the vagina of a ten-year-old victim); McCoy v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006) (finding pregnancy of a minor was sufficient to elevate statutory rape to a Class
A felony although Indiana has never found such in an adult rape case).
106
See, e.g., U.S. v. Buckley, 195 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that evidence of pain
and bleeding was sufficient to support a finding of serious bodily injury).
107
See, e.g., People v. Cross, 190 P. 3d 706, 709 (Cal. 2008) (arguing that “‘carrying a baby
for 22 weeks . . . in a 13-year-old body’ was significant or substantial”).
108
See infra Part III.B (comparing the physical and mental effects of pregnancy,
miscarriage, and abortion to other injuries courts commonly consider to be substantial
bodily injury).
109
Cross, 190 P.3d at 717. “Pregnancy can have one of the three results—childbirth,
abortion or miscarriage. Childbirth is an agonizing experience. An abortion by whatever
method used constitutes a severe intrusion into a woman's body. A miscarriage speaks for
itself.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Each year over 32,000 women become pregnant in
the U.S. as the result of rape and approximately fifty percent of these pregnancies end in
abortion. Illinois General Assembly, Sexual Assault Survivors Emergency Treatment Act
Amendments Sec. 2.2(a)(2), www.ilga.gov/legislation/95/SB/0 9500SB1618enr.htm (last
visited Sept. 29, 2008).
110
“Pregnancy is a sui generis condition that cannot fairly be described as trivial or
insignificant.” Cross, 190 P.3d at 717. See also State v. Jones, 889 S.W.2d 225, 231 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1994) (“The physical discomfort [of pregnancy] is apparent. Obviously, there
would be a need for medical care.”).
111
Cross, 190 P.3d at 717.
112
Ezine Articles, What Do Labor Contraction and Labor Pains Feel Like?,
http://ezinearticles.com/?What-Do-Labor-Contraction-and-Labor-Pains-FeelLike?&id=492295 (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
105
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stretching of the cervix, vagina, and perineum produce pressure on the
abdomen and pelvic area, causing severe pain.113 The woman’s cervix
dilates, and as the baby approaches, the perineum stretches, causing a
burning sensation.114 As the baby progresses, most women tear.115
Furthermore, other complications may arise from the pregnancy.116
“Every organ system in a woman’s body changes during pregnancy
in order to meet the needs of the developing fetus and to prepare the
woman for delivery.”117 Many pregnant women feel faint, feel tired,
hyperventilate, suffer lower back pain, have severe personality changes,
and experience pain and discomfort.118 The cardiac system increases
output during pregnancy by approximately one-third.119 A pregnant
woman’s heart rate increases by fifteen to twenty beats per minute.120
The developing fetus displaces organs in order to make room to grow.121
Pregnancy also causes increased congestion, and breathing through the
nose may become more difficult.122 Furthermore, in the later stages of
Id.
Id.
115
Id.
116
See
American
Pregnancy
Association,
Pregnancy
Complications,
http://americanpregnancy.org/pregnancycomplications/index.htm (last visited Sept. 29,
2008). Such complications as bacteria build-ups and infections may result from pregnancy.
Id. “Pregnant adolescents are at increased risk for complications including low birth
weight, infant mortality, preterm delivery, urinary tract infections, pyelonephritis,
preeclampsia, and abortion. Unmarried teens (but not married teens) who become mothers
are at increased risk for depressive symptoms later in life.” (Footnotes omitted.) See also
The Medical Institute, What Happens to Teen Mothers?, http://www.medinstitute.org/
public/118.cfm (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
117
41 AM JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D § 3 (2008). A pregnant woman experiences changes to
her cardiovascular system, abdominal organs, and endocrine system. Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. The woman’s heart rate increases during the first few months of pregnancy and
remains elevated throughout the course of the pregnancy. Id.
120
Id.. Other changes to the cardiovascular system include an increased risk of
hemorrhage, a drop in cardiac output, increased blood volume, and increased coagulation
of blood. Id.
121
Id. The bladder is displaced upward and forward as the uterus enlarges, the kidneys
and uterus become dilated due to the compression of the uterus, the woman’s intestines
compress, and her diaphragm is raised approximately four centimeters. Id. The uterus
enlarges to about three times its normal size. Teenwire.com, How a Woman’s Body Changes
During
Pregnancy,
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/teen-talk/teen-pregnancy/
healthy-pregnancy/how-womans-body-changes-during-pregnancy-25336.htm?-utma=1.10
40638891.1264613946.1264613946.1264613946.1&_utmb=1.6.10.1264613946&utmc=1&utmx=
-&_utmz=1.1264613946.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)│utmccn=(direct)│utmcmd=(none)&_utmv=-&
_utmk=58079530 (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
122
41 AM JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D § 3 (2008). Other changes to the respiratory system
include the diaphragm having greater movement when the woman is breathing, an
increased rate of breathing, and she is likely to suffer increased congestion of respiratory
tract. Id.
113
114
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pregnancy, the woman’s mobility is reduced and her gait unsteady.123
Permanent changes to the woman’s body may include stretch marks,
change in breast shape, varicose veins, increased weight, loss of calcium,
and increased proclivity for hemorrhoids.124 Therefore, the woman
experiences significant injuries, many of which a woman experiencing an
abortion or miscarriage will also suffer.125
2.

Abortion

“An abortion by whatever method used constitutes a severe
intrusion into a woman's body.”126 Fifty percent of all rape-related
pregnancies end in abortion.127 There are two types of abortion procedures
used: surgical abortions and medical abortions.128 During a surgical
abortion, the physician dilates the cervix, scrapes the uterus, and
suctions the fetus and placenta.129 This procedure commonly results in

Id. Because of this, the woman is more susceptible to falls. Id. Since the woman’s
calcium level decreases until the thirty-fourth through thirty-sixth week, this may lead to
greater injuries. Id.
124
Revolution Health, How to Counter the Effects of 5 Common Post-Pregnancy Problems,
http://www.revolutionhealth.com/healthy-living/pregnancy/postpartum-care-mom/
recovery-healing/post-pregnancy-problems (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
125
See infra Part II.E.2–3 (discussing the mental and physical effects of abortion and
miscarriage).
126
People v. Cross, 190 P.3d 706, 717 (Cal. 2008).
127
Illinois General Assembly, Sexual Assault Survivors Emergency Treatment Act
Amendments Sec. 2.2(a)(2), www.ilga.gov/legislation/95/SB/0 9500SB1618enr.htm (last
visited Sept. 29, 2008) (discussing in section 2.2(a)(2) the extent of rape-related pregnancy).
128
MARIA COSTA, ABORTION, 174–75 (ABC-CLIO 1996).
129
The type of surgical procedure used depends upon the state of pregnancy the woman
is in. American Pregnancy Association, Surgical Abortion Procedures, http://www.american
pregnancy.org/unplannedpregnancy/surgicalabortions.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
Suction aspiration is the surgical abortion performed during the first six to twelve weeks.
Id. This procedure is administered by placing the patient under anesthesia, using a
tenaculum to hold the cervix in place, dilating the cervix with cone shaped rods, and then
inserting a long plastic suction device to suck out the fetus and placenta. Id. While the
procedure only lasts ten to fifteen minutes, recovery can take hours. Id. A pregnancy
within its twelfth to fifteenth week is typically aborted by a dilation and curettage
procedure. Id. A looped shaped knife scrapes the lining of the uterus, removing the
placenta and fetus. Id. A cannula may be inserted for a final suctioning. Id. A surgical
procedure known as dilation and evacuation is administered during weeks fifteen through
twenty-one of the pregnancy. Id. This procedure is performed by physically inserting a
laminaria or a dilator inside the cervix. Id. The next day, the doctor will clamp a
tenaculum to the cervix to keep the cervix in shape and insert cone shaped rods to keep the
cervix dilated. Id. Next, the lining will be removed by a looped shaped knife and scraped
to remove any residue. Id. Finally, any remains will be suctioned out. Id. This procedure
is generally performed at the hospital since there are greater risks of complications. Id.
123

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss2/6

Hoyson: Rape is Tough Enough Without Having Someone Kick You from the Ins

2010]

Pregnancy as Substantial Bodily Injury

585

cramping and soreness.130 More severe complications, such as bleeding,
damage to the uterus, and infection, may arise depending on the age and
health of the patient.131 Medical abortions are available only during the
first few weeks of pregnancy and are conducted by digesting or injecting
a drug into the woman’s body.132 The side effects typically include
bleeding, fatigue, nausea, weakness, and morning sickness.133 The longterm effects of both types of abortions typically include fertility and
psychological problems.134 In either case, the woman experiences
another unwanted physical invasion of her body, as is also the case with
miscarriage and childbirth.135
3.

Miscarriage

“A miscarriage speaks for itself.”136 Women who have a miscarriage
may experience symptoms for a few weeks up to a month afterwards.137
Frequent side-effects include bleeding, abdominal pain, breast
discomfort, and infection.138 Roughly half of all women who experience
a miscarriage undergo a dilation and curettage (D&C) procedure to

130
COSTA, supra note 128, at 174–75. See also Surgical Abortion Procedures, supra note 129.
Most women will feel faint and experience cramping, nausea, and sweating. Id. Other side
effects include heavy or prolonged bleeding, blood clots, damage to the cervix, perforation
of the uterus, infection due to retained products of conception, and infection caused by a
sexually transmitted disease or bacteria being introduced to the uterus. Id. A dilation and
curettage abortion increases the risk of perforation of the uterus. Id. A dilation and
evacuation abortion also poses an increased risk of blood clots, perforation of the uterus,
infection, and damage to the uterus lining or cervix. Id.
131
COSTA, supra note 128, at 174–75. See also Surgical Abortion Procedures, supra note 129.
132
COSTA, supra note 128, at 175. Drugs, such as Mifepristone or Methotrexate are
administered. Id. See also Surgical Abortion Procedures, supra note 129. After the drugs are
administered, contractions will expel the fetus. Surgical Abortion Procedures, supra note 129.
This will last anywhere from a few hours to a few days. Id. However, this procedure is
available only during the first few weeks of the first trimester. Id. Additionally, the
procedure is unsuccessful ten percent of the time, requiring further surgical procedures. Id.
133
COSTA, supra note 128, at 175.
134
COSTA, supra note 128, at 177.
135
See People v. Cross, 190 P.3d 706, 709 (Cal. 2008) (comparing the invasiveness of an
abortion to that of a heart transplant because it is an operation requiring anesthesia and
drugs to control the bleeding).
136
Id. at 717. Approximately ten to twenty-five percent of all pregnancies result in
miscarriage. American Pregnancy Association, Miscarriage, http://www.american
pregnancy.org/pregnancycomplications/miscarriage.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
137
American Pregnancy Association, After a Miscarriage: Physical Recovery, http://www.
americanpregnancy.org/pregnancyloss/mcphysicalrecovery.html (last visited Sept. 29,
2008) [hereinafter After a Miscarriage]. The length of recovery depends on how far the
pregnancy was advanced. Id.
138
Id.
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remove excess tissue that her body did not release.139 A D&C procedure
is a surgery that involves dilating the uterus and removing the tissue
that was not expelled.140 Despite the obvious physical effects, as well as
those caused by pregnancy and abortion, states continue to treat raperelated pregnancy differently.141
F. State Treatment of Rape-Related Pregnancy
States do not treat rape-related pregnancy uniformly when
determining an assailant’s sentence.142 States addressing the issue fall
into four categories: (1) include pregnancy in a state statute to aggravate
the assailant’s sentence;143 (2) exclude evidence of rape-related
pregnancy;144 (3) always include pregnancy as substantial bodily
injury;145 or (4) include pregnancy as an aggravating factor on a case-bycase basis, depending on the outcome and circumstances surrounding
the pregnancy.146 These approaches are further discussed below.
1.

State Statutes

Wisconsin, Michigan, and Nebraska have adopted statutes that
include pregnancy as an aggravating factor to rape.147 Wisconsin’s
statute aggravates sexual assault to a first-degree felony when pregnancy
results, whereas Nebraska and Michigan include pregnancy in their
139
American Pregnancy Association, D&C Procedure After a Miscarriage,
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/pregnancycomplications/dandc.html (last visited
Sept. 29, 2008) [hereinafter D&C Procedure]. Most miscarriages occur within the first
thirteen weeks of pregnancy. Id. Treatment is often necessary to prevent hemorrhaging
and infection. Id. A D&C procedure removes fetal tissue that the woman’s body does not
expel on its own. Id.
140
Id. The tissue is either removed by suction or by scraping the uterus wall with a
curette instrument. Id.
141
See infra Part II.F. (discussing how some states exclude evidence of rape-related
pregnancy while others consider it an aggravating factor).
142
See infra Parts II.F.1–4 (discussing how states treat evidence of rape-related
pregnancy). Uniform laws help deter crime because severity and certainty are the greatest
predictors of crime rate. JAMES W. BURFEIND & DAWN JEGLUM BARTUSCH, JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY 260 (Jones & Bartlett Publishers 2006).
143
See infra Part II.F.1 (discussing Wisconsin’s, Michigan’s, Nebraska’s, and Florida’s
statutes).
144
See infra Part II.F.2 (discussing how some states do not allow evidence of rape-related
pregnancy to be introduced at trial).
145
See infra Part II.F.3 (discussing Tennessee’s approach of always considering pregnancy
to be substantial bodily injury absent a statute).
146
See infra Part II.F.4 (discussing states that look at extraneous factors to determine if
pregnancy is substantial bodily injury).
147
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520a(n) (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(4) (2008); WISC.
STAT. § 940.225(1)(a) (2008).
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definitions of bodily injury.148 Despite this difference, all three statutes
increase the assailant’s sentence in all cases that result in pregnancy.149
Florida is the only state that has adopted a statute that applies solely
to minors who are impregnated as a result of rape.150 Florida’s statute
makes it an independent felony offense to impregnate a minor.151
Consent and lack of chastity are not a defense to this crime.152 However,
not all states recognize pregnancy as substantial bodily injury.153
2.

States That Do Not Treat Pregnancy as Substantial Bodily Injury

According to other courts, pregnancy is not substantial bodily
injury.154 The United States v. Yankton court defined substantial bodily
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520a(l) (2004) (“’Personal injury’ means bodily injury,
disfigurement, mental anguish, chronic pain, pregnancy, disease, or loss or impairment of a
sexual or reproductive organ.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(4) (2008) (“Serious personal
injury means great bodily injury or disfigurement, extreme mental anguish or mental
trauma, pregnancy, disease, or loss or impairment of a sexual or reproductive organ.”);
WIS. STAT. § 940.225(1)(a) (2008) (defines the Class B felony of first degree sexual assault as
“sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person without consent of that person”
which “causes pregnancy or great bodily harm to that person”). “These types of physical
manifestations to a woman's body during pregnancy and delivery clearly fall within the
definition of ‘bodily injury,’ for the manifestations can and do cause damage to the body.”
People v. Cathey, 681 N.W.2d 661, 666 (Mich. App. 2004).
149
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b(1)(f) (2004) (“A person is guilty of criminal sexual
conduct in the first degree if he or she engages in sexual penetration with another person
and if any of the following circumstances exists: . . . (f) The actor causes personal injury to
the victim and force or coercion is used to accomplish sexual penetration.”); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-319(2) (2008) (“Sexual assault in the first degree is a Class II felony. The
sentencing judge shall consider whether the actor caused serious personal injury to the
victim in reaching a decision on the sentence.”). In State v. Beyer, 422 N.W.2d 462, 462 (Wis.
App. 1988), the court stated that the sentence could be aggravated under Wisconsin’s
statute even though the pregnancy ended in a miscarriage. However, in this case, the
evidence of the pregnancy was unpermitted since it was only introduced to uphold the
credibility of the victim. Id.
150
FLA. STAT. § 827.04(3) (2006).
151
Id. (“A person 21 years of age or older who impregnates a child under 16 years of age
commits an act of child abuse which constitutes a felony of the third degree.”).
152 FLA. STAT. § 827.04(3) (2006).
See also Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2007)
(applying FLA. STAT. § 827.04(3)).
153
See infra Part II.F.2 (discussing states that fail to recognize pregnancy as substantial
bodily injury).
154
United States v. Yankton, 986 F.2d 1225, 1229–30 (8th Cir. 1993). However, the Eighth
Circuit subsequently held that bodily injury resulting from a pregnancy was sufficient to
aggravate a sentence, although the pregnancy itself was not substantial bodily injury.
United States v. Guy, 340 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir. 2003). The Court found substantial bodily
injury because of the factors accompanying that pregnancy, such as the complete tear
between the victim’s vagina and rectum that resulted from the rape. Id. See also State v.
Moore, 585 A.2d 864, 886–87 (N.J. 1991) (finding that pregnancy and its termination are not
aggravating factors); Hynes v. Bd. of Educ. of Bloomfield Twp., Essex County, 461 A.2d
148
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injury as “injury involving extreme physical pain or the impairment of a
function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or requiring
medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical
rehabilitation.”155 The Yankton court reasoned that including pregnancy
within this definition would stretch the language of the statute too far.156
The court noted that serious bodily injury should include only the
immediate trauma resulting from rape.157
Although states are nearly unanimous in admitting evidence of
pregnancy in statutory rape cases because it proves penetration,158 some
states exclude evidence of rape-related pregnancy in rape trials with
adult victims.159 This determination depends on the nature of the offense

1184, 1186 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1983) (finding that pregnancy was not injury in a disability
discrimination case).
155
Yankton, 986 F.2d at 1229.
156
Id. “Given the guideline language used and the absence of any record, Sentencing
Commission history, or commentary to the contrary, we find that the Sentencing
Commission did not intend the situation presented by the facts in this case to be addressed
by the specific offense characteristic adjustment in § 2A3.1(b)(4).” Id. In this case, T.L., a
minor, was impregnated by her rapist. Id. at 1230. Whether her pregnancy could be
considered substantial bodily injury was an issue of first impression for the court. Id. at
1229. Substantial bodily injury is defined in that jurisdiction as “injury involving extreme
physical pain or the impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty;
or requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical
rehabilitation.” Id. Relying on the sentencing guidelines, the court found that including
pregnancy in the definition of substantial bodily injury would stretch the definition too far
because only immediate physical trauma was supposed to be considered. Id.
157
Id. “[S]erious bodily injury easily includes any immediate serious physical trauma
resulting from a rape.” Id.
158
See Martin v. Commonwealth, 476 S.W.2d 834, 835 (Ky. 1972) (admitting evidence of
the impregnation of a teenage girl into the defendant’s trial for rape); State v. Henderson,
139 A.2d 515, 518 (Me. 1958) (permitting the introduction of evidence of thirteen-year-old
victim’s pregnancy to corroborate her testimony); J.A. Bock, Annotation, Admissibility, in
Nonstatutory Rape Prosecution, of Evidence of Pregnancy of Prosecutrix, 62 A.L.R.2d 1083 (1958).
159
Bock, supra note 158; 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 43 (2008) (“In prosecutions for forcible
rape, some courts have determined that evidence of the prosecutrix's subsequent
pregnancy is properly admitted, but other courts have taken the view that evidence of the
pregnancy of the prosecutrix is irrelevant and inadmissible in prosecutions for forcible
rape.”). Compare State v. Chambers, 309 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Wash. 1957) (holding that
evidence of rape-related pregnancy was irrelevant and inadmissible), and People v. Loftus,
11 N.Y.S. 905, 907 (1890) (holding that evidence that the victim became pregnant as a result
of rape is irrelevant and should not be admitted), with Hall v. State, 378 So. 2d 1193, 1194
(Ala. Crim. App. 1979) (holding that evidence of pregnancy after forcible rape was
admissible), and People v. Seeley, 75 N.Y.S.2d 833, 835 (Rockland Co. Ct. 1948) (holding
that birth of child is evidence that intercourse occurred, but is not sufficient to establish that
the defendant was the assailant). See also 35A N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law: Substantive
Principles and Offenses § 713 (“The timely pregnancy of any female, or birth of a child, is
evidence that sexual intercourse was performed.”).
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and the state’s rape shield statute.160 The courts that draw this
distinction between rape and statutory rape validate it on the grounds
that pregnancy establishes that the crime has been committed in
statutory rape cases.161 Yet, in adult rape cases, pregnancy merely
establishes that intercourse occurred; it does not prove lack of consent.162
Therefore, proof of pregnancy does not prove the commission of a crime
in adult rape cases as it does in statutory rape cases.163
Courts that exclude the admission of pregnancy as evidence in
forcible rape cases base their decision on the prejudicial effect that
introducing such evidence might have on jurors.164 In State v. Chambers,
the Washington Supreme Court determined that evidence of rape-related
pregnancy was irrelevant to the trial.165 The court reasoned that the
admission of rape-related pregnancy did not establish the corpus delicti of
the crime and was highly prejudicial.166 Conversely, not all courts are
this stringent when applying the definition of substantial bodily injury to
pregnancy.167
3.

States That Always Treat Pregnancy as Substantial Bodily Injury

Tennessee is the only state that always considers pregnancy to be
substantial bodily injury without reference to a statute.168 In Tennessee,
the age of the victim does not affect how the courts determine whether

160
See Stallings v. State, 508 N.E.2d 550, 553 (Ind. 1987) (“Any evidence of the victim's
past sexual conduct, including the fact of the victim's pregnancy, is inadmissible under the
rape shield act.”); Moore v. State, 393 N.E.2d 175, 177 (Ind. 1979) (holding that evidence of
the victim’s rape-related pregnancy was inadmissible under the rape shield statute). See
also Bock, supra note 158. Courts allow evidence of rape-related pregnancy to be admitted
in statutory rape cases. Id.
161
Chambers, 309 P.2d at 1057. See supra Part II.B (discussing the elements of rape and
statutory rape).
162
See DRESSLER, supra note 25, at 166; 35A N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law: Substantive
Principles and Offenses § 713; 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 11 (2008).
163
See generally 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 11 (2008) (discussing the difference between
statutory rape and ordinary rape and how each law views consent).
164
Loftus, 11 N.Y.S. at 907 (finding that pregnancy was not relevant to the alleged crime
of rape); Chambers, 309 P.2d at 1057 (holding that evidence of rape-related pregnancy was
inadmissible because it had a prejudicial effect and had no bearing on the element of
consent).
165
309 P.2d at 1056.
166
Id. The corpus delicti is the “fact of a transgression; ACTUS REUS.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 395 (9th ed. 2009).
167
See infra Part II.F.3 (discussing states that always treat pregnancy as substantial bodily
injury).
168
See State v. Smith, 910 S.W.2d 457, 461 (Tenn. 1995) (finding that pregnancy was
substantial bodily injury sufficient to aggravate the rapist’s sentence); State v. Jones, 889
S.W.2d 225, 231 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
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the rapist receives an aggravated sentence.169 This is because “[t]he
physical discomfort [of pregnancy] is apparent. Obviously, there would
be a need for medical care.”170 For these reasons, pregnancy fits within
the state’s definition of substantial bodily injury.171
4.

States That Find Pregnancy to be Substantial Bodily Injury on a
Case-by-Case Basis

Other courts instruct the jury that an assailant’s sentence can be
increased when the rape results in pregnancy, on a case-by-case basis.172
Courts consider such elements as the victim’s age, the outcome of the
pregnancy, and the complications that arise throughout the course of the
pregnancy when determining whether the punishment should be
aggravated.173
A recent California decision found that the rape of a thirteen-yearold girl resulting in an abortion was substantial bodily injury, sufficient
to support enhancement of the assailant’s sentence.174 Prior to this
169
See Jones, 889 S.W.2d at 231 (finding that a pregnancy is substantial bodily injury,
independent of the age of the victim).
170
Id.
171
Id. Tennessee defines bodily injury as “a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn or disfigurement,
and physical pain or temporary illness or impairment of the function of a bodily member,
organ, or mental faculty” TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106(2) (2006).
172
United States v. Shannon, 110 F.3d 382, 396–87 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that sexual
intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl that resulted in pregnancy was a crime of violence
increasing the base offense level); People v. Cross, 190 P.3d 706, 712 (Cal. 2008) (finding
that it was proper to instruct the jury that uncomplicated pregnancy of a minor was
substantial bodily injury, but determining that this instruction does not need to be given in
all rape cases in which pregnancy results); Smith, 910 S.W.2d at 461 (finding that pregnancy
of fourteen-year-old sexual assault victim satisfied the enhancement requirements of the
state’s statutory rape law). Courts have been more willing to find that pregnancy is
substantial bodily injury when the pregnancy is accompanied by other aggravating factors.
See People v. Sargent, 86 Cal. App. 3d 148, 152 (1978) (finding that pregnancy can constitute
substantial bodily injury in the forcible rape of a minor).
173
Cross, 190 P. 3d at 717. “Factors such as the age of the victim, as well as the outcome,
duration, or problems associated with a pregnancy may make its impact even more
substantial.” Id. (Corrigan, J., concurring). See also Shannon, 110 F.3d at 396–97; Sargent, 86
Cal. App. 3d at 152.
174
Cross, 190 P.3d at 708. In this case, a thirteen-year-old girl was repeatedly raped by
her stepfather. Id. at 708–709. The victim occasionally rejected these acts, but was reluctant
to do so for fear that her cell phone would be taken away. Id. at 709. The victim’s
stepfather took her to the hospital where they learned she was twenty-two weeks pregnant
and near the end of the second trimester. Id. The next day the victim’s stepfather took her
back to the hospital for an abortion. Id. The abortion had to be performed surgically since
the victim was in a late stage of pregnancy. Id. At trial, the jury was instructed that they
could consider “either the pregnancy or the abortion, or both, as a basis for the allegation of
personal infliction of great bodily injury.” Id. In California, great bodily injury is defined
as “a significant or substantial physical injury.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.7(f) (West 2003).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss2/6

Hoyson: Rape is Tough Enough Without Having Someone Kick You from the Ins

2010]

Pregnancy as Substantial Bodily Injury

591

decision, the court had found substantial bodily injury only when the
pregnancy was accompanied by other injuries or the pregnancy involved
complications.175 However, the court split on whether the jury should be
instructed that pregnancy is substantial bodily injury in all cases.176
Although the majority determined that the issue did not need to be
decided in that case, the concurring opinion reasoned that, regardless of
the outcome, pregnancy has a substantial effect on the woman’s body
and her right to privacy.177
The concurring opinion noted that “[b]ecause the impact of any
pregnancy is so great, it is illogical to treat some pregnancies as trivial, or to
suggest that juries could, somehow, determine that any criminally imposed
pregnancy can be considered minor.”178 On the other hand, the California
Supreme Court and other court systems elect to make this determination
on a case-by-case basis.179 Therefore, it is not clear here, or in other
courts that apply this standard, whether uncomplicated pregnancies or
pregnancies that result in abortion or miscarriage will always qualify as
substantial bodily injury.180
By instructing the jury that pregnancy is substantial bodily injury on
a case-by-case basis, courts risk being inconsistent in the application of
substantial bodily injury.181 Pregnancy has a substantial effect on all
women, whether it involves complications or not.182 Furthermore, the
effect of pregnancy on adult women is no less severe than on minors.183
Therefore, pregnancy provides grounds for increasing an assailant’s
sentence in all cases, as analyzed below.184

175
Cross, 190 P.3d at 717; Sargent, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 152 (finding pregnancy was
substantial bodily injury in a forcible rape case).
176
Cross, 190 P.3d at 717 (“Because the impact of any pregnancy is so great, it is illogical
to treat some pregnancies as trivial, or to suggest that juries could, somehow, determine
that any criminally imposed pregnancy can be considered minor.”).
177
Id. The opinion reasoned that pregnancy by its very nature will always satisfy the
state’s definition of substantial bodily injury. Id.
178
Id.
179
Id. (determining that the court did not need to decide whether the jury should always
be instructed that pregnancy constitutes substantial bodily injury). See United States v.
Shannon, 110 F.3d 382, 396–97 (7th Cir. 1997) (instructing the jury that pregnancy is
substantial bodily injury on a case-by-case basis).
180
See Cross, 190 P.3d at 717.
181
Id. (discussing how rapists could receive different sentences depending upon the
outcome of the pregnancy).
182
See supra Part II.E (discussing the physical and psychological effects of pregnancy,
miscarriage, and abortion on a woman).
183
See infra Part III.A (discussing how pregnancy affects women and minors equally).
184
See infra Part III.B (arguing that pregnancy is always substantial bodily injury). See
also Cross, 190 P.3d at 717 (arguing that pregnancy should be considered substantial bodily
injury in all cases).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 [2010], Art. 6

592

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

III. ANALYSIS
As rape laws evolved, women garnered greater protection and
opportunities to find justice.185 The next step in the development of rape
laws is the application of substantial bodily injury to rape-related
pregnancy.186
Many states fail to fairly apply the principles of
substantial bodily injury when determining a rapist’s sentence.187 Part
III.A determines whether the differences between rape and statutory
rape warrant different treatment for finding that pregnancy is substantial
bodily injury. Then, Part III.B considers whether the mental and
physical effects of pregnancy satisfy the definition of substantial bodily
injury as it is defined liberally, commonly, and strictly. Part III.C
analyzes the methods states apply to determine whether pregnancy is
substantial bodily injury. Some states exclude evidence of pregnancy
from a rape trial, some always consider pregnancy to be substantial
bodily injury by statute, and others consider it on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, Part III.D discusses the benefits of states adopting a uniform
approach for considering pregnancy as substantial bodily injury.
A. Comparison of Rape to Statutory Rape for Purposes of Considering
Pregnancy as an Aggravating Factor
States are generally more willing to find that pregnancy is
substantial bodily injury in cases involving minors.188 Courts justify this
difference on the grounds that pregnancy has a severe effect on a minor’s
body.189 But pregnancy may affect older women more severely than
minors.190
For example, adult women are more likely to have

See supra Part II.A. Originally rape was difficult to prosecute because the laws were
designed to protect rapists from false accusations. CLING, supra note 40, at 15. However,
the Women’s Movement spurred the evolution of laws so that rape was given the same
treatment as other crimes. Herman, supra note 24.
186
Treating rape-related pregnancy as substantial bodily injury would secure equal
justice for rape victims that are impregnated by treating their injury the same as other
similar injuries. See infra Parts II.B.–E.
187
See infra Parts III.B–D (discussing how the effects from childbirth, abortion, and
miscarriage satisfy the definition of substantial bodily injury).
188
Dougherty, supra note 92. See, e.g., Cross, 190 P.3d at 709.
189
See, e.g., Cross, 190 P.3d at 709 (stating that carrying a baby in a teenager’s body was
significant and substantial).
190
Cedars-Sinai Health Sys., Quality Measures, http://www.csmc.edu/11154.html (last
visited Oct. 30, 2008). The maternal age of the mother increases the likelihood of
miscarriage and complicated pregnancies. American Pregnancy Institute, Miscarriage,
http://www.americanpregnancy. org/pregnancycomplications/miscarriage.html.
185
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miscarriages and pregnancy complications.191 Furthermore, pregnancy
is not a trivial matter for any woman, regardless of her age.192
Although the crimes of rape and statutory rape are independent
offenses, these differences do not provide grounds for treating evidence
of rape-related pregnancy differently. Statutory rape laws protect a
minor from her lack of knowledge and experience.193 This does not
mean, however, that pregnancy affects minors more severely.194 Since a
woman suffers substantial harm no matter what age she is, these crimes
should be treated the same for purposes of applying substantial bodily
injury to rape-related pregnancy.195 However, states must first recognize
that pregnancy is substantial bodily injury under the liberal, common,
and strict definitions of substantial bodily injury.196
B. Comparison of Childbirth, Miscarriage, and Abortion to the Definition of
Substantial Bodily Injury
When courts consider treating rape-related pregnancy as substantial
bodily injury for rape or statutory rape, they must first analyze the
state’s definition of substantial bodily injury, which is usually defined by

Am. Pregnancy Ass’n, supra note 136. Women between thirty-five and forty-five years
old have a twenty to thirty percent chance of miscarriage, but women under the age of
thirty-five face a fifteen percent chance. Id. For women over the age of forty-five, the odds
increase to fifty percent. Id. See also Nat’l Infertility Ass’n, Resolve, http://www.resolve.
org/site/DocServer/Miscarriage-The-HiddenLoss.pdf?docID=221 (last visited Oct. 30,
2008). Women over the age of thirty-five are also more likely to have complicated
pregnancies. Cedars-Sinai Health System, supra note 190. For example, certain problems
during labor are more common for older women, such as placenta disruption, which
causes a premature separation of the placenta from the fetus, requiring the mother to
undergo a cesarean section. Elizabeth Eden, A Guide to Pregnancy Complications,
http://health.howstuffworks. com/a-guide-to-pregnancy-complications-ga1.htm.
192
See supra Part II.E. (discussing the hardships of pregnancy).
193
Oberman, supra note 41, at 818.
194
Under statutory law, rapists are punished for engaging in sexual relations with a
minor who is legally incapable of giving consent. 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 11 (2008). Rape
requires proof that the act was committed against the woman’s will since she is legally
capable of consenting. DRESSLER, supra note 25, at 166. However, this distinction does not
speak to the effect pregnancy has on a minor’s body. Although there may be some risks
associated with teenage pregnancy that are not as common with adult pregnancies, most of
these effects are associated with the minor’s reluctance to seek the necessary prenatal care.
Elizabeth Eden, supra note 191. However, these effects can occur with anyone who does
not seek prenatal care. March of Dimes, Prenatal Care, http://www.marchofdimes.com/
hbhb_syndication/18622_513.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). Therefore, the victim’s status
as a minor should not be a deciding factor in determining the assailant’s punishment.
195
Id.
196
See infra Part III.B (arguing that states should always consider pregnancy to be
substantial bodily injury).
191
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statute.197 Therefore, the definition varies by state.198 Thus, it is
necessary to compare the effects of childbirth, miscarriage, and abortion
on a woman’s body to substantial bodily injury under the liberal,
common, and strict definitions that states employ.199
1.

Liberal Definition of Substantial Bodily Injury

As previously noted, the liberal definition of substantial bodily
injury includes any proof of bodily injury, fear, or mental injury as
evidence sufficient to support the increase of a rapist’s sentence.200
Pregnancy, miscarriage, and abortion significantly affect a woman’s
mental and physical well-being.201 For example, pregnancy causes every
organ in a woman’s body to change, in addition to cramping, fatigue,
nausea, breast tenderness, frequent urination, and difficulty sleeping.202

197
See Dougherty, supra note 92. See supra Part II.D (defining substantial bodily injury by
state statute).
198
See supra Part II.D (defining substantial bodily injury by state).
199
See supra Part II.D (defining substantial bodily injury). Under the liberal definition,
substantial bodily injury includes fear and any evidence of bodily injury significant enough
to warrant an increase in the defendant’s sentence. See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 495 N.E.2d
665, 667–68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); State v. Ingram, 688 So.2d 657, 665 (La. Ct. App. 1997); State
v. Baker, 441 S.E.2d 551, 555 (N.C. 1994). States commonly require proof of broken bones
or lacerations to warrant the increase of an assailant’s sentence. See People v. Williams, 115
Cal. App. 3d 446, 454 (1981) (finding that evidence of a torn hymen and accumulation of
blood was sufficient to support a finding of substantial bodily injury); People v. Culton, 92
Cal. App. 3d 113, 117 (1979) (finding evidence of bruises, abrasions, and broken bones
sufficient to support a finding of substantial bodily injury); State v. Roberts, 235 S.E.2d 203,
213 (N.C. 1977) (holding that injuries constituted serious bodily injury where the victim’s
teeth would eventually fall out and there was pain and impairment in the functioning of
her jaw). However, other states require proof of permanent disfigurement or risk of death
to satisfy the definition of substantial bodily injury. See, e.g.,TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 1.07(46) (Vernon 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-1-104, 6-2-302(a)(ii) (2004); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.0 (2)–(3).
200
See, e.g., Wallace, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 667–68; Baker, 441 S.E.2d at 555 (finding that the
rape victim’s mental injuries, which included weight loss, depression, trouble sleeping, and
a difficult time interacting with others, to be serious personal injury); Ingram, 688 So. 2d at
665 (finding that fear of two victims who worried the assailant would harm them were they
to refuse was sufficient to support a finding of aggravated rape); Jackson v. State, 968
S.W.2d 495, 501 (Tex. App. 1998) (finding that the victim’s fear of bodily injury was
sufficient evidence to increase the assailant’s sentence); Mata v. State, 952 S.W.2d 20, 33
(Tex. App. 1997) (finding that threats of bodily injury were sufficient to increase the rapist’s
sentence).
201
See supra Part II.E (discussing the effects of pregnancy, abortion, and miscarriage on a
woman).
202
41 AM JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D § 1 (2008); Women’s Health Care Topics,
http://www.womenshealthcaretopics.com/pregnancy_week_1_and_2.htm (last visited
Jan. 29, 2009).
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Furthermore, childbirth causes significant tears in the flesh and severe
pain.203
Similarly, a woman who suffers from a miscarriage has the physical
effects of pregnancy until the time of the miscarriage.204 In miscarriage,
the woman experiences bleeding and abdominal pain, and may have to
undergo a surgical procedure to remove the remaining tissue.205
Accordingly, the woman is physically affected, which is all the liberal
definition requires.206
Furthermore, a woman who undergoes an abortion may experience
significant side effects.207 A woman electing to have a surgical abortion
clearly must undergo surgery, which involves the use of a knife to scrape
the uterus lining and remove the placenta and fetus.208 Such a procedure
causes bleeding and perforations, which exceed the liberal definition’s
requirement for evidence of any bodily change.209 Similarly, a medical
abortion causes a woman to have cramps and bleed, which indicate that
the body is trying to expel unwanted tissue and repair itself.210 Thus,
pregnancy, miscarriage, and abortion satisfy the liberal definition of
substantial bodily injury.211
Mental effects also accompany pregnancy, abortion, and miscarriage,
all of which satisfy the liberal definition.212 Postpartum depression is a
203
Ezine Articles, What Do Labor Contraction and Labor Pains Feel Like?,
http://ezinearticles.com/?What-Do-Labor-Contraction-and-Labor-Pains-FeelLike?&id=492295.
204
Am. Pregnancy Ass’n, supra note 136.
205
Miscarriage also causes bruising, which has been recognized as sufficient to satisfy the
liberal definition of substantial bodily injury. After a Miscarriage, supra note 137.
206
The bleeding caused by miscarriage is also evident of bodily injury. Kid Scientist,
Why Do We Bleed, http://kidscientist.com/10/why-do-we-bleed/ (last visited Oct. 31,
2008).
207
See supra Part II.E.2 (discussing the side effects of abortion).
208
Surgical Abortion Procedures, supra note 129. A D&C procedure is performed during
the first twelve to fifteen weeks of gestation. Id. After the knife is used to scrape out the
fetus, the remaining tissue is suctioned out. Id. Alternatively, a suction aspiration can be
applied during the first six to twelve weeks. Id. This procedure involves dilating the cervix
and suctioning out the fetus and placenta. Id. However, both procedures pose a risk of
permanently impairing a woman’s reproductive organs. Id.
209
Id. Suction aspiration also causes cramping, nausea, sweating, feeling faint, and
bleeding. Id. The side effects of a D&C abortion are the same as a suction abortion, with an
increased risk of perforation to the uterus. Id.
210
COSTA, supra note 128, at 175. Bleeding and soreness are evidence of bruising and
lacerations. Kid Scientist, supra note 206.
211
Because medical and surgical abortions cause pain, bleeding, and cramping, which
indicate physical injuries, the liberal definition, which simply requires proof of some
physical injury, is satisfied. Surgical Abortion Procedures, supra note 129.
212
Pregnancy, miscarriage, and abortion can all lead to depression. U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., Depression During and After Pregnancy, http://www.4woman.gov/FAQ/
postpartum.htm#2 (last visited Oct. 30, 2008); Post Abortion Syndrome Symptoms,
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common side effect of pregnancy and miscarriage.213 The symptoms of
postpartum depression include depression, difficulty sleeping, decreased
appetite, low self-esteem, and feeling upset, alone, and afraid.214
Abortion has also been found to cause depression in women.215 Because
the liberal definition recognizes such psychological effects as weight loss,
depression, and difficulty sleeping as substantial bodily injury, the
mental effects of pregnancy, abortion, and miscarriage satisfy the
definition.216
Thus, courts interpreting the liberal definition of
substantial bodily injury should recognize pregnancy as substantial
bodily injury, whether it results in childbirth, miscarriage, or abortion.217
However, states more commonly require a slightly heightened standard
to increase an assailant’s sentence under the substantial bodily injury
doctrine.218

http://postabortionsyndrome.org/post_abortion_syndrome_symptoms.html (last visited
Feb. 29, 2009). The liberal definition recognizes depression as substantial bodily injury.
State v. Baker, 441 S.E.2d 551, 553 (N.C. 1994).
213
Up to eighty percent of women who give birth experience these symptoms.
eMedicine Health, Postpartum Depression, http://www.emedicinehealth.com/postpartum_
depression/article_em.htm.
214
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Depression During and After Pregnancy,
http://www.4woman.gov/FAQ/postpartum.htm#2 (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
Miscarriage also has a psychological impact on a woman, causing such side-effects as
depression and anxiety. Frederick R. Jelovsek, The Emotional Effects of Miscarriage,
http://www.wdxcyber.com/nmood07.htm (Oct. 31, 2008).
215
Post
Abortion
Syndrome
Symptoms,
http://postabortionsyndrome.org/
post_abortion_syndrome_symptoms.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2009). Many women who
have had an abortion feel guilt, anxiety, psychological “numbing”, develop eating
disorders or drug problems, and suffer from other psychological problems. Id.
216
See, e.g., Baker, 441 S.E.2d at 555 (finding that the rape victim’s mental injuries, which
included weight loss, depression, trouble sleeping, and a difficult time interacting with
others, to be serious personal injury).
217
Since the liberal definition recognizes any physical alteration as well as mental side
effects as sufficient to satisfy the definition of substantial bodily injury, and pregnancy,
miscarriage, and abortion have both physical and mental side effects, courts applying this
definition should find that pregnancy is always substantial bodily injury. See People v.
Wallace, 495 N.E.2d 665, 667–68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Baker, 441 S.E.2d at 555 (finding that the
rape victim’s mental injuries, which included weight loss, depression, trouble sleeping, and
a difficult time interacting with others to be serious personal injury); State v. Ingram, 688
So. 2d 657, 665 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that the fear of two victims who worried the
assailant would harm them were they to refuse was sufficient to support a finding of
aggravated rape); Jackson v. State, 968 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Tex. App. 1998) (finding that the
victim’s fear of bodily injury was sufficient evidence to increase the assailant’s sentence);
Mata v. State, 952 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Tex. App. 1997) (finding that threats of bodily injury were
sufficient to lengthen the rapist’s sentence); COSTA, supra note 128, at 175; Surgical Abortion
Procedures, supra note 129.
218
See supra note 93 (providing many state definitions of substantial bodily injury).
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Common Definition of Substantial Bodily Injury

The common definition of substantial bodily injury recognizes
evidence of broken bones, lacerations, and torn hymens as sufficient to
support an increase in the rapist’s sentence.219 The physical effects of
pregnancy, miscarriage, and abortion outweigh the injuries that courts
applying this standard have commonly found sufficient to support the
increase of the rapist’s sentence. For example, childbirth results in tears
and soreness that may require stitches, similar to lacerations.220 The tears
a woman suffers during childbirth coincide with the injury of a torn
hymen that states commonly consider sufficient to increase the rapist’s
sentence.221 Furthermore, pregnancy involves nine months of pain,
discomfort, impaired mobility, and hours of severe pain during labor;
whereas broken bones take four weeks to three months to heal.222 It
makes little sense to include an injury that causes pain over a shorter
period of time to be substantial bodily injury, while treating pregnancy,
which causes pain, injury, and impaired movement over a longer period
of time as insufficient to satisfy the definition of substantial bodily
injury.223 Therefore, the physical effects of pregnancy exceed the
requirements set forth by the common definition of substantial bodily
injury and should be recognized as an aggravating factor.
In addition to the physical effects that result from carrying a child, a
woman who suffers a miscarriage experiences bleeding, abdominal pain,
discomfort, lacerations, and possibly infection, which is consistent with
the lacerations and torn hymens that courts find sufficient to satisfy the
Dougherty, supra note 92.
See Ezine Articles, What Do Labor Contraction and Labor Pains Feel Like?,
http://ezinearticles.com/?What-Do-Labor-Contraction-and-Labor-Pains-FeelLike?&id=492295. The tears and lacerations that result from childbirth may be severe
enough to require stitches. Id. In the average woman, stretching and tearing during
childbirth reduces the perineum from two to three inches of skin and tissue before
pregnancy to a few millimeters.
Teri Brown, The Perineum and Pregnancy,
http://www.pregnancytoday.com/articles/labor-preparation/the-perineum-andpregnancy-4878/.
221
Brown, supra note 220. Women suffer tears in their perineum as a direct result of
pregnancy. Id. The perineum is the skin and tissue between the vagina and rectum. Id.
The hymen is a sheet of tissue over the vaginal pass. NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 663 (3d ed.
1988). The hymen generally tears during sexual intercourse or may tear from engaging in
sporting activities. Negative or Positive, Terminology, http://www.negativeorpositive.
com/negative/terminology.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008). While a torn hymen can cause
bleeding, a torn perineum is more severe, as it may require stitches. Teri Brown, The
Perineum and Pregnancy, http://www.pregnancytoday.com/articles/labor-preparation/
the-perineum-and-pregnancy-4878/.
222
Wise Geek, How Long Do Broken Bones Take to Heal, http://www.wisegeek.com/howlong-do-broken-bones-take-to-heal.htm.
223
Id.
219
220

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 [2010], Art. 6

598

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

common definition because both cause bleeding and pain and can lead to
infection.224 Additionally, over fifty percent of women who suffer a
miscarriage must undergo a surgical D&C procedure, which involves
scraping out the uterus.225 Abortions use this same procedure.226
Because states commonly consider injuries that require surgery to be
substantial bodily injury, miscarriage and surgical abortion satisfy the
definition.227
Although the side effects of a medical abortion are less severe than a
surgical abortion, they are similar to the lacerations and broken bones
that courts recognize as substantial bodily injury.228 In both situations,
the victim requires substantial recovery time while the body is trying to
repair itself from injury.229 Thus, medical abortion also satisfies the
common definition.
Most states apply a version of this definition to injuries to determine
whether the crime should be aggravated.230 So although it appears that
pregnancy easily satisfies the definition of substantial bodily injury in
most states, it may be harder to find that it meets the definition’s
requirements in states that apply a stricter definition.231
3.

Strict Definition of Substantial Bodily Injury

It is more difficult to find that the effects of pregnancy, miscarriage,
and abortion fit within the strict definition of substantial bodily injury.232
Courts applying the strict definition of substantial bodily injury interpret
it liberally to provide greater relief to the victim.233 For example, Texas
After a Miscarriage, supra note 137.
D&C Procedure, supra note 139.
226
Surgical Abortion Procedures, supra note 129.
227
See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, No. B203609, 2009 WL 201412, at *1 (Cal. App. 2009)
(discussing the jury’s finding of bodily injury when the victim had to undergo two
surgeries); State v. Lilly, 450 S.E.2d 546, 548–49 (N.C. App. 1994) (holding that victim
sustained serious personal injuries where she had to have surgery that took three days to
recover from). Dougherty, supra note 92.
228
COSTA, supra note 128, at 175. Bleeding and soreness are evidence of bruising and
lacerations. Kid Scientist, supra note 206.
229
Kid Scientist, supra note 206.
230
Dougherty, supra note 92. See also supra note 93 (defining substantial bodily injury
among states).
231
See infra Part III.C.3.
232
The strict definition of substantial bodily injury requires a showing of permanent
disfigurement, substantial risk of death, or loss or impairment to a bodily organ. See, e.g.,
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(46) (Vernon 2008).
233
See, e.g., Camarillo v. State, 82 S.W.3d 529, 537–38 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that the
plaintiff suffered substantial bodily injury where she suffered a broken nose that impaired
her ability to breathe); Moore v. State, 802 S.W.2d 367, 369–70 (Tex. App. 1990) (holding
that injury still exists although surgery corrected disfigurement); Abadie v. State, 101
224
225
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courts have recognized that a broken nose that was corrected through
surgery and evidence that a victim was hit in the head with a metal rod
causing physical pain were sufficient to satisfy its definition of
substantial bodily injury.234 This interpretation is consistent with the
liberal and common definitions of substantial bodily injury and
encompasses the effects of pregnancy, miscarriage, and abortion
resulting from rape.235
Under a literal reading of the strict definition of substantial bodily
injury, it is more difficult to find that the effects of an uncomplicated
pregnancy, miscarriage, or abortion satisfy the definition of substantial
bodily injury because pregnancy is not typically thought of as causing
permanent disfigurement or loss of a bodily organ.236 However, the
strict definition of substantial bodily injury recognizes evidence of
impairment of a bodily organ as sufficient to increase a rapist’s
sentence.237 Consistent with this definition, pregnancy causes changes in
every organ of the body, including the cardiovascular system, abdominal
organs, and endocrine system.238 In particular, the uterus increases to
one thousand times its initial capacity and ascends into the abdomen and
liver.239 Pregnancy also temporarily impairs the reproductive organs.240
Similarly, miscarriage causes short-term impairments to the reproductive
organs, and poses a risk of long-term impairment if the woman is forced
to undergo a D&C procedure, which may weaken the woman’s uterus
and impair her ability to conceive.241 Because a surgical abortion
S.W.2d 238, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1937) (finding that evidence that the victim was weak,
unable to work, and had to remain in the hospital for fourteen days was sufficient to
support a finding of substantial bodily injury).
234
See supra note 99 (discussing Texas court interpretations of substantial bodily injury).
235
See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text (discussing whether pregnancy satisfies
the liberal and common definition of substantial bodily injury).
236
A case-by-case analysis would still be warranted under a literal interpretation,
because some pregnancies may have more severe effects than others. Am. Pregnancy
Ass’n, supra note 116. However, to determine if pregnancy satisfies the definition, a
common pregnancy should be analyzed.
237
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(46) (Vernon 2008). Texas defines serious bodily injury
as “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious
permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ.” Id.
238
41 AM JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D § 1 (2008).
239
Elizabeth Eden, Understanding Pregnancy Symptoms, HOW STUFF WORKS,
http://health.howstuffworks.com/understanding-pregnancy-symptoms1.htm.
240
See supra Part II.E (discussing the physical and mental effects of pregnancy).
241
American Pregnancy Association, supra note 116. Am. Pregnancy Ass’n, Getting
Pregnant Again, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/pregnancyloss/mcgettingpregnant
again.html. Women are advised to wait approximately three months to try to conceive
again. Id. Following a miscarriage a woman must generally wait several months to
conceive. Id.
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requires a procedure similar to a D&C, the same risks of long-term
impairment exist.242 Abortion can also cause impairment to the
reproductive organs and poses a risk of death to the female.243 Thus, the
strict definition of substantial bodily injury is arguably satisfied even
under a literal reading.
Despite pregnancy’s severe effects on women, no matter what the
outcome of that pregnancy may be, and pregnancy’s clear place under
the substantial bodily injury doctrine, states continue to treat raperelated pregnancy differently.244
C. State Treatment of Rape-Related Pregnancy
As analyzed above, the effects of rape-related pregnancy satisfy the
definition of substantial bodily injury.245 Nevertheless, states continue to
treat rape-related pregnancy differently.246 While some states exclude
evidence of rape-related pregnancy, others apply substantial bodily
injury on a case-by-case basis.247 In either case, states ignore the
substantial effects that uncomplicated pregnancies can have on a
woman.248 Thus, states that always consider rape-related pregnancy to
be substantial bodily injury avoid these controversies and fairly apply
the principles of substantial bodily injury.249 This section analyzes the
approaches courts undertake when considering whether pregnancy is
substantial bodily injury.250
1.

States that Exclude Evidence of Rape-Related Pregnancy

By excluding evidence of rape-related pregnancy, courts maintain
the traditional view that assailants need to be protected from false

Surgical Abortion Procedures, supra note 129.
Pregnancy Ctrs., Considering Abortion, http://www.pregnancycenters.org/abortion.
html (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). There is a risk of death in abortion procedures. Id.
Abortion can damage the uterus or cause infection, which can require further surgical
procedures, including a hysterectomy. Id.
244
See infra Part III.C (analyzing state treatment of rape-related pregnancy).
245
See supra Part III.B (discussing whether the effects of pregnancy, miscarriage, and
abortion satisfy the definition of substantial bodily injury).
246
See supra Part II.F (discussing state treatment of evidence of rape-related pregnancy).
247
See supra Parts II.F.2, 4 (discussing states that exclude evidence and states that find
substantial bodily injury on a case-by-case basis, respectively).
248
See supra Part II.E (discussing the effects of pregnancy on a woman’s body).
249
Cornell
Univ.
Law
Sch.,
Aggravating
factor,
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/aggravating_factor (last visited Jan. 12, 2009).
250
See infra Parts III.C.1–3.
242
243
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accusations by women.251 States that do not consider rape-related
pregnancy to be substantial bodily injury base their reasoning on the
theory that evidence of rape-related pregnancy is prejudicial or
irrelevant.252 By excluding the evidence, the state protects the rapist and
denies the jury the opportunity to hear the extent of the injury the rapist
caused.253 Therefore, states treat injuries from rape less favorably than
injuries in other crimes, maintaining the historic disregard for rape.254
Proof of rape-related pregnancy does not pose a greater risk of
prejudice than evidence of other injuries. The purpose of applying
substantial bodily injury principles is to punish the defendant for the
harm he causes.255 Because impregnated victims experience harm
beyond that of other victims, the defendant should be punished
accordingly to fulfill this purpose.256 Given that courts have traditionally
used evidence of injury to impose sentences and determine damages,
evidence of rape-related pregnancy should be treated no differently.257
The condition is inflicted on the female through no choice of her own.258
Furthermore, it cannot be denied that the pregnancy has a physical effect
on the female’s body, just as other injuries do.259 Therefore, states should
treat pregnancy the same as other injuries.260

Exclusion of the evidence protects the rapist from evidence being introduced showing
the consequences of his actions. By excluding this evidence, the rapist is protected from
having the jury know the extent of the injury he caused. In this way courts treat the effects
of rape differently from other injuries, just as rape has been treated differently from other
crimes throughout history. See supra Part II.A (discussing the history of rape).
252
People v. Loftus, 11 N.Y.S. 905 (1890) (finding that pregnancy was not relevant to the
alleged crime of rape); State v. Chambers, 309 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Wash. 1957) (holding that
evidence of rape-related pregnancy was inadmissible because it had a prejudicial effect and
had no bearing on the element of consent); 65 AM. JUR. 2D, Rape § 43 (some courts have
determined that evidence of rape-related pregnancy is irrelevant and inadmissible in
prosecutions for forcible rape). Courts have also reasoned that including rape-related
pregnancy as substantial bodily injury would stretch the meaning too far. See supra Part
II.B–D.
253
ORRIN G. HATCH, JURY AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 187–88 (1995). Excluding
relevant evidence “provides nothing for the innocent, but freedom for the guilty.” Id. at
187.
254
See supra Part II.A (discussing the history or rape laws that have historically failed to
sufficiently punish the rapist).
255
Cornell Univ. Law Sch., supra note 249.
256
See supra Part II.E (discussing the mental and physical alterations of pregnancy,
abortion, and miscarriage).
257
CYNDI BANKS, PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 2–3 (2005).
258
People v. Cross, 190 P. 3d 706, 717 (Cal. 2008).
259
See supra Part II.E.
260
Pregnancy has a substantial effect on a woman’s body. See supra Part II.E. Many of
the effects are consistent with injuries that are considered substantial bodily injury. See
supra Part III.B.
251
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Rape-related pregnancy is also relevant to the trial.261 Although
some courts discarded its relevance in adult rape cases because
pregnancy was not proof that rape had occurred, as it is in statutory rape
cases, this provides no grounds for undermining its relevance.262
Because many courts do not consider injuries that occur after the
criminal act to be substantial bodily injury, courts that find pregnancy
irrelevant to a rape trial may follow the principle that pregnancy is an
injury that occurs after the act.263 However, pregnancy is a direct result
of the criminal act of rape and begins to develop at the time of the act,
regardless of the fact that the full effect of pregnancy is not realized until
afterward.264 Rape-related pregnancy is not only proof that intercourse
occurred, it also shows the extent of harm inflicted on the victim.265
Therefore, courts that exclude evidence of rape-related pregnancy are
excluding evidence of injury that has always been pertinent to trials.
2.

States that Find Pregnancy to be Substantial Bodily Injury on a Caseby-Case Basis

Other courts consider pregnancy to be substantial bodily injury on a
case-by-case basis.266 Courts that instruct the jury that pregnancy is a
substantial bodily injury on a case-by-case basis consider the age,
pregnancy complications, and the circumstances surrounding the
pregnancy.267 This ignores the fact that the pregnancy itself has a
substantial effect on the woman’s body.268 Instead, the court should
always instruct the jury that pregnancy is substantial bodily injury.269
Courts often hold defendants accountable for the injuries they cause, even if the extent
of the outcome is unforeseeable. Keith A. Rowley, To Err is Human, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1407, 1433 (2006) (“In criminal and tort law, the role of risk is often expressed in the form of
a notion that wrongdoers . . . take the risk of their conduct turning out worse than they
expected.”) (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, subsequent injuries that courts
exclude are injuries that were not inflicted by the defendant during the course of the act in
question. Roy C. Dripps, Exclusion of Damage-Reducing Evidence in Injury Litigation, 87 ILL.
B.J. 368, 369 (1999). Thus the irrelevance argument is unpersuasive.
262
Although the evidence does not prove that the act occurred, this is not necessary for
evidence to be relevant. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Relevant evidence is defined as “that which has any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.” Id. at 587 (internal quotations omitted).
263
Dripps, supra note 261, at 369.
264
See supra Part II.E (discussing the effects of pregnancy).
265
See 35A N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law: Substantive Principles and Offenses § 713; 65 AM. JUR.
2D Rape § 11 (2008); DRESSLER, supra note 25, at 166.
266
See, e.g., People v. Cross, 190 P.3d 706, 717 (Cal. 2008).
267
Id.
268
Id. “Factors such as the age of the victim, as well as the outcome, duration, or
problems associated with a pregnancy may make its impact even more substantial.” Id. See
261
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Juries must evaluate the severity of the injury’s impact to determine
whether it satisfies the state’s definition of substantial bodily injury.270
For example, when a victim suffers a broken bone, the injury could vary
from a small hairline fracture to a compound fracture requiring
surgery.271 Therefore, it is necessary for the jury to determine whether
the fracture satisfies the definition of substantial bodily injury.272 But a
female is either pregnant or she is not.273 There is no continuum of injury
for the jury to evaluate.274 Therefore, a case-by-case analysis is
inappropriate.275
Furthermore, it makes little sense to punish one rapist more than
another simply because the pregnancies of the victims have different
outcomes.276 If two rapists each impregnate a victim and one victim’s
pregnancy results in a miscarriage while the other pregnancy is carried
to term, the defendants should not be punished differently because of
the outcome.277 The court cannot consider either outcome trivial when
determining a defendant’s sentence.278 Furthermore, the injury from
pregnancy, regardless of the outcome, extends beyond that which is
normally associated with rape, so the defendant should be punished
accordingly.279 Therefore, courts that have already found that pregnancy
constitutes substantial bodily injury should always instruct the jury that
pregnancy is substantial bodily injury.280

also United States v. Shannon, 110 F.3d 382, 396–97 (7th Cir. 1997); People v. Sargent, 86 Cal.
App. 3d 148, 152 (1978). See also supra Parts II.B–D.
269
Cross, 190 P.3d at 717–18.
270
Id. at 717.
271
Pain Health Info, Different Types of Painful Fractures, http://pain.healthinfo.org/different-types-painful-fractures.
272
Cross, 190 P.3d at 717.
273
Id.
274
Id.
275
Since there is no continuum on which the jury can decide, the jury cannot play its
normal role in deciding whether the injury is substantial bodily injury. Id. Thus,
pregnancy cannot be decided on a case-by-case basis.
276
Id.
277
Id. See also, supra Part II.E. Under either outcome, pregnancy affects the woman and
her body in a substantial way. Id. Therefore, these outcomes should not be given different
treatment.
278
See supra Part II.E (discussing the effects of pregnancy on a woman’s body).
279
See supra Part II.E (discussing the effects of pregnancy on a woman’s body). Since
pregnancy has an additional effect on a woman’s body, and pregnancy occurs in only
approximately two hundred rape cases each year, it is injury beyond what is normally
associated with rape. Dr. John C. Willke, Rape Pregnancies are Rare, CHRISTIAN LIFE
RESOURCES, Apr. 1999, http://www.christianliferesources.com/?library/view.php&
articleid=461.
280
See infra Part III.C.3.
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States that Always Consider Pregnancy to be Substantial Bodily
Injury

The remainder of states addressing the issue of whether pregnancy
should aggravate a defendant’s sentence always include pregnancy
within the definition of substantial bodily injury through statute or case
law.281 This approach correctly punishes the victim for the harm he
causes because pregnancy, no matter what the outcome, has a severe
effect on victims.282 It is clear that impregnated victims face challenges
beyond those that victims who do not become impregnated
experience.283 Therefore, the courts that consider pregnancy to be
substantial bodily injury provide justice to the victim by punishing the
assailant according to the extent of the victim’s injuries, rather than
returning to the common roots of rape laws and protecting the defendant
from his own actions.
Also, in these states, each defendant who impregnates a victim
would receive uniform punishment regardless of the outcome of those
pregnancies.284
Therefore, the judgments from these courts are
consistent and benefit the state.
D. Benefits of Adopting a Uniform Law
States would benefit from adopting a uniform law providing for
pregnancy to be considered substantial bodily injury.285 Having a
uniform law would promote fairness across the states.286 Defendants in
rape cases across the states would receive the same punishment for the
harm that they caused.287 A uniform law would also serve to deter crime
because severity and certainty of punishment have been linked to
decreased crime rates.288 Furthermore, “[u]niform rules would also help
281
See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520a(n) (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(4) (2008); WIS.
STAT. § 940.225(1)(a) (2008); Smith, 910 S.W.2d at 461 (finding that pregnancy was
substantial bodily injury, sufficient to aggravate the rapist’s sentence); Jones, 889 S.W.2d at
231.
282
See supra Part II.E (discussing the effects of pregnancy on a woman’s body).
283
See supra Part II.E (discussing the effects of pregnancy on a woman’s body).
284
See People v. Cross, 190 P.3d 706, 717 (Cal. 2008).
285
Besides punishing the victim for the actual harm he causes, a uniform punishment
would deter crime. BURFEIND & BARTUSCH, supra note 142, at 260. When certainty and
severity of punishment are high, crime rates are low. Id. Since a uniform law would
increase the certainty, it would serve to deter rape. Id.
286
Nancy T. Gardner, Cameras in the Courtroom: Guidelines for Criminal Trials, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 475, 507 (1985).
287
Id.
288
BURFEIND & BARTUSCH, supra note 142, at 260. Since studies show that certainty and
severity affect the crime rate, and a uniform law providing for pregnancy to be substantial
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prevent favoritism, corruption, and local prejudice.”289 Thus, states stand to
benefit from adopting a uniform law providing for pregnancy to be
considered substantial bodily injury.290
IV. CONTRIBUTION
States differ greatly in how they treat evidence of rape-related
pregnancy. To promote consistency and to fully punish the rapist for his
actions, states should uniformly adopt pregnancy as an aggravating
factor to the definition of rape. There are three alternative ways to
accomplish this: (1) adopt a uniform definition of substantial bodily
injury; (2) add the term pregnancy to each state’s already existing
definition of substantial bodily injury; or (3) adopt pregnancy as an
aggravating factor within the state’s definition of first degree rape.
A. Uniform Definition of Substantial Bodily Injury
Although states differ greatly in how they define substantial bodily
injury, a uniform statute has the potential to benefit all states. Under this
approach, states would first have to determine whether the strict,
common, or liberal definition of substantial bodily injury is most
appropriate. Despite differences in the definition of substantial bodily
injury, an ideal statute would state:
Substantial bodily injury includes cuts, abrasions,
bruises, burns, disfigurement, physical pain, temporary
illness, pregnancy, impairment of a bodily organ, or
injury that requires surgical correction.
This statute, which is most consistent with the common definition of
substantial bodily injury, provides protection to victims, while also
balancing the criminal’s interest in being fairly punished.291 Adding
pregnancy to a uniform substantial bodily injury statute would rectify
the core problem of states ignoring pregnancy as an aggravating
bodily injury would increase both the severity of punishment and the certainty that the
punishment would be applied, crime would be deterred. Id.
289
Gardner, supra note 286, at 507 (internal quotations omitted).
290
States will benefit from deterrence of crime. BURFEIND & BARTUSCH, supra note 142, at
260.
291
Because most states have adopted the common approach, it would be easiest for the
remaining states to convert to this definition. See supra note 86 (defining substantial bodily
injury among states). Furthermore, the common approach provides the best balance
between punishing the actor and preventing crime since it is not overly harsh or seemingly
liberal. See Part II.D (discussing the differences between the liberal, common, and strict
definitions of substantial bodily injury).
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factor.292
Because the physical effects of pregnancy are underrecognized, such a statute would ensure that states treat pregnancy the
same as other injuries recognized as substantial bodily injury, which
generally have physical effects that are similar to pregnancy.293 This
would also solve the problems of states applying pregnancy as
substantial bodily injury on a case-by-case basis and of states excluding
pregnancy as irrelevant. This is because pregnancy would aggravate the
sentence in all cases, thereby making the pregnancy relevant and
rendering the factors used in a case-by-case analysis irrelevant.294 This is
the desired outcome because there is no continuum on which to judge
pregnancy and no pregnancy can be considered trivial.295 A uniform
definition would ensure that pregnancy is always considered an
aggravating factor to rape in all states and would fully punish the rapist
for the harm he inflicts. Furthermore, a uniform definition of substantial
bodily injury would serve the added benefit of deterring crime because it
would increase the severity and certainty of punishment.296
On the other hand, each state’s definition of substantial bodily injury
is applied to other crimes.297 Thus, states may be reluctant to entirely
alter their definition of substantial bodily injury. Moreover, other
alternatives require less effort on the part of the legislature and the
courts and would solve the current problem of failing to consider
pregnancy as an aggravating factor.
B. Adding Pregnancy to the Existing Definition of Substantial Bodily Injury
Adding pregnancy to the existing definition of substantial bodily
injury is perhaps the easiest and most viable method for states to adopt.
Under this approach, states employing the strict definition of substantial
See supra Parts III.B–C (discussing how pregnancy satisfies the definition of substantial
bodily injury, courts’ failure to recognize it as an aggravating factor, and the errors in the
current approaches courts take to analyzing pregnancy as substantial bodily injury).
293
See supra Part III.B. Since the injuries commonly recognized as substantial bodily
injury are consistent with other injuries considered substantial bodily injury, adding
pregnancy to the definition would eliminate the courts’ reluctance to adopt pregnancy as
an aggravating factor.
294
See supra Part II.F.2, 4 (discussing how some courts exclude evidence of rape-related
pregnancy while others consider it on a case-by-case basis, considering such factors as the
victim’s age and complications of pregnancy).
295
See People v. Cross, 190 P.3d 706, 717 (Cal. 2008).
296
Severity and certainty of punishment are the best indicators of crime rate. BURFIEND
& BARTUSCH, supra note 142, at 260. Therefore, a uniform statute would create certainty,
thereby decreasing the crime rate of not only rape, but also other crimes to which it applies.
See id.
297
See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the aggravating factors to rape).
See also supra note 93 (defining substantial bodily injury among states).
292
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bodily injury should alter their statutes to state that substantial bodily
injury is:
Bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or
that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement,
pregnancy, or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ.298
Whereas a state that liberally defines substantial bodily injury should
adapt their statute to state:
Substantial bodily injury results when the assailant
inflicts physical pain, mental anguish, or pregnancy on
anyone, or causes submission by threat.299
Because states disagree greatly on how to define substantial bodily
injury, adding pregnancy to the existing definition would be beneficial
because it does not alter the state’s current application of the term.300
Specifically, states that already define substantial bodily injury by listing
injuries could easily add one more injury to their definition.301
Additionally, this method would not force courts to apply a new
definition of substantial bodily injury to other crimes or require
legislatures to entirely rework an existing definition.
Besides being a more viable option, adding pregnancy to the existing
definition of substantial bodily injury would rectify the problem of
courts failing to consider pregnancy an aggravating factor. Under this
approach, assailants would be fairly punished according to the harm
they cause.302 Also, the trier of fact would not have to weigh arbitrary
factors to determine whether substantial bodily injury should be
298
See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text (discussing injuries that courts
commonly find to be substantial bodily injury). This proposed statute was adapted from
statutes and court opinions that include injuries commonly considered substantial bodily
injury.
299
See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text (discussing the liberal definition of
substantial bodily injury, which includes any proof of bodily harm, fear, or mental
injuries). This statute was adapted from case law and statutes that apply a liberal
definition.
300
See supra note 93 (defining substantial bodily injury among states). See also Part III.C
(discussing the three approaches to defining substantial bodily injury and their application
to pregnancy).
301
See supra note 93 (defining substantial bodily injury among states).
302
Because pregnancy causes effects similar to injuries recognized as substantial bodily
injury, it should be recognized as substantial bodily injury. See Part III.B. Since assailants
receive a greater sentence for causing other injuries, they should also receive one for
impregnating their victim.
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applied.303 Rather, pregnancy would always be considered a substantial
bodily injury in all states. Thus, states would obtain some of the benefits
of a uniform statute, such as deterrence and fairness, so long as
legislatures do not create exceptions for applying pregnancy as an
aggravating factor.304 Due to the ease with which this method could be
adopted and the benefits it produces, this method may be preferred.
Conversely, not all states list impairments within their definition of
substantial bodily injury.305 Therefore, it may be easier for some states, if
they do not wish to adjust their statutory scheme, to add pregnancy to
their definition of first degree rape.
C. Adding Pregnancy to the Definition of First Degree Rape
Adding pregnancy to the definition of first degree rape would also
be an easy method to adopt. This option would be most beneficial for
states that do not list specific impairments under their definition of
substantial bodily injury. Under this approach, states should adopt the
following language for first degree sexual assault:
Any person who has sexual contact or sexual intercourse
with another, absent their consent and causes substantial
bodily injury or pregnancy is guilty of first degree
assault.306
Under this approach, states that do not currently list impairments
within their definition of substantial bodily injury would not be required
303
People v. Cross, 190 P.3d 706, 717 (Cal. 2008) (discussing the factors courts consider
when determining whether pregnancy is substantial bodily injury, including age and
complications of pregnancy).
304
By adding pregnancy to the definition of substantial bodily injury in every state, the
increase in punishment and increased awareness would likely lead to a decrease in the
crime rate because severity and certainty are the leading indicators of crime rate. BURFIEND
& BARTUSCH, supra note 142, at 260. To promote awareness and certainty, states would
have to treat pregnancy as an aggravating factor without exceptions. While legislatures
might be inclined to exclude uncomplicated pregnancies or pregnancies that end in
abortion as substantial bodily injury, this would detract from its deterrent factor. See Cross,
190 P.3d at 717. While this method will also deter crime, it may not be as effective as all
states applying a uniform definition of substantial bodily injury. A uniform statute would
produce the greatest certainty because states would be applying the same standard. See
BURFIEND & BARTUSCH, supra note 142, at 260. However, given the minimal differences
between these two approaches, the difference in the rape rate would likely be miniscule.
However, adopting a uniform method may also help to deter other crime since the
definition is applied to all crimes.
305
See supra note 93 (defining substantial bodily injury among states).
306
See WIS. STAT. § 940.225(1)(a) (2008). This model statute is based on Wisconsin’s
definition of first-degree assault. Id.
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to add an impairment to their definition. Nor would legislatures have to
redraft the current definition of substantial bodily injury. Furthermore,
this approach is consistent with the other two methods in that it
adequately punishes the rapist for the injury he causes and it eliminates
the need to look at extraneous factors to determine whether to increase
the sentence, because pregnancy would be an aggravating factor in all
rape cases. Therefore, this would be a simple solution for states that do
not list impairments within their definitions of substantial bodily injury.
D. Choosing the Best Alternative
Ideally, states should adopt a uniform definition of substantial
bodily injury because it would promote uniformity, deter crime, and
correct the courts’ current reluctance to apply pregnancy as an
aggravating factor.307 Nevertheless, all three approaches would resolve
the problem of courts failing to recognize pregnancy as an aggravating
factor. Thus, the second and third approaches may be more viable since
other criminal laws would not be affected and states would not have to
redevelop their entire definition of substantial bodily injury. Depending
on the state’s statutory scheme, it may be more beneficial for a state to
add pregnancy to its existing definition of substantial bodily injury or to
its first degree rape statute. Irrespective of the approach taken, rapists
would receive appropriate punishment and women would receive
justice. Thus, states can adopt whichever method is easiest and most
beneficial, because all three approaches rectify the problem of states
failing to recognize pregnancy as substantial bodily injury.
V. CONCLUSION
Throughout history rape has been under-recognized and underprosecuted. The evolution of rape laws brought great change, to the
point that states almost treat rape the same as other crimes. However,
the current rape laws do not adequately punish the assailant under all
circumstances. Although other criminal laws punish an assailant
according to the injury he inflicts, rape laws fail to adequately punish the
rapist when he impregnates his victim. Since the impregnated victim

307
A uniform statute creates the most certainty because states would apply it the same.
BURFEIND & BARTUSCH, supra note 142, at 260. Since the severity of punishment would be
the same under all three approaches, certainty is the variable factor. A uniform statute
adopted by all states would clearly give the actors the best idea of what to expect. Id.
Because the definition of substantial bodily injury applies to other crimes, greater certainty
of punishment may also decrease the incidence of these crimes.
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experiences physical effects beyond those of the ordinary victim,
extended punishment is warranted.
Currently, the physical effects of pregnancy are consistent with the
definition of substantial bodily injury, and should be applied as such.
Courts commonly recognize more trivial injuries, such as bruises and
lacerations, as substantial bodily injury. Furthermore, the case-by-case
analysis applied by some courts ignores the fact that every pregnancy
has significant physical and mental effects. To resolve this issue, as well
as the courts’ reluctance to apply principles of substantial bodily injury
to rape-related pregnancy, states should adopt a uniform statute
including pregnancy in the definition of substantial bodily injury. The
adoption of such a law would create deterrence and uniformity among
the states. Thus, a man who rapes his stepdaughter, causing her to have
an uncomplicated abortion would receive punishment identical to that of
the rapist of an adult woman who suffers five years of mental anguish
after having an abortion, and that of the rapist of an adult woman who
carries the child to term and undergoes the physical pain of childbirth.
The outcome of pregnancy cannot be considered trivial in any of these
circumstances, this is the desired outcome to fully and fairly punish the
rapist, and can easily be achieved by the addition of a single term to preexisting laws.
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